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FOREWORD 
This publication n~ports studies carried on coopera-
tively under a memorandum of agreement b!)tween the 
agricultural experiment stations of Missouri, Iowa, Ne-
braska and Kansas, the University of Chicago, and the 
Farm Economics Research Division, Agricultural Re-
search Service, with assistance from the North Central 
Land Tenure Research Committee (NCR-6) and the 
Farm Foundation. 
Recognizing the importance of improving the land 
tenure arrangements on many farms in the North Cen-
tral Region and the need for research with regard to 
thc relative efficiency of alternative tenure arrange-
ments, the cooperating agencies initiated a study to de-
termine (1) the impacts of various tenure arrangements 
on farming efficiency, (2) the attributes of tenurc ar-
rangcments that constitute obstacles to efficiency and 
(3) the remedial methods for minimizing the obstacles 
observed. 
The work reported here represents the first phase of 
that study, which is being continued by the cooperating 
agencies. It is the product of a pilot study concerned 
with the analysis of relationships between some of the 
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conventional land tenure classes-owner-operators, live-
stock-share renters and crop-share-cash renters-and 
the use and productivities of land, labor and capital 
~ervices employed in Iowa and the northern two-thirds 
of Illinois. 
The findings will likely be of interest to those con-
c~rned with efficiency in agriculture. The study ex-
plores the use of single estimating equations for de-
termining differences in efficiency between land tenure 
classes. Hence the report is somewhat technical in parts 
and is, in this respect, of particular interest to research 
workers engaged in the analysis of land tenure and re-
source~allocation problems. 
The data upon which the analysis is based were col-
lected for the 1954 production year in a livestock mar-
keting study by Iowa State College in cooperation with 
the University of Illinois. The latter study was initiated 
and largely financed by the Chicago Stockyards and 
Transit Company. 
NOBLE CLARK, Administrative Advisor 
North Central Regional Land Tenure Research 
Committee 
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SUMMARY 
This report covers the results of a study of the effects 
of farm operators' tenure status on resource allocation. 
The primary objective of the study was to observe the 
way in which resources are used within agricultural 
firms operated under different farm tenure classes. The 
tenure classes considered were owner-operators, and 
livestock-share and crop-share-cash renters. The data 
used were obtained from Iowa and northern Illinois for 
the 1954 production year. 
The major hypotheses that set the course of the study 
were concerned with the relations between the selected 
tenure classes and (1) the levels of marginal returns 
and resource inputs and (2) the deviations of the actual 
from the optimum combinations of resources. The basic 
estimating equations used in testing the hypotheses were 
of the form, 
/\ 3 
log Y = log a + ::s b l log XI 
i=1 
in which Y denotes gross production in dollars and 
the resource categories, XI'., refer to land and capital 
services in dollars and labor in weeks. 
The analysis of resource marginal returns showed 
that the kinds of resource readjustments needed to ap-
proach optimum production levels vary to some extent 
according to tenure class. For owner-operators, the 
marginal return to labor is low, and the return to capital 
services is high in relation to the opportunity costs as-
sumed. This means that resource allocation could be 
improved with the use of more capital services by own-
er-operators. But part of the lower productivity of labor 
under owner-operatorship might be attributed to its 
quality. The patterns of marginal returns to resources 
under the two lease types are similar; all the marginal 
returns are higher than the opportunity costs assumed. 
Land is the most limited resource because the marginal 
returns to other resources are not significantly higher 
than the related opportunity costs; only the differences 
for land are significant. 
The analysis of resource combinations at the respec-
tive mean value of outputs for each tenure group 
showed that the younger owners are'the least efficient. 
They show the largest deviation of actual "costs" from 
the minimum costs attainable. Livestock-share renters 
are the most efficient. The differences between the 
tenure groups in their deviations from minimum costs 
could be due to chance. Hence, there are doubts as to 
~20 
whether the traditional broad classes of tenure exam-
ined differ in the aggregate with respect to the level of 
efficiency achieved in terms of resource combinations. 
The nature of the adjustments needed to approach 
an optimum combination of resources, however, varies 
between owners and tenants. Owner-operators should 
have used less of both land and labor and more capital 
to achieve the optimum combinations. Owner-operators 
are the only ones to show a deficit in capital services. 
Tenants are most efficient in the use of labor services, 
but they are excessive in capital services and deficient 
in land. The most significant inefficiencies are in terms 
of the land-capital substitution in both types of leases. 
These occurrences could be due partIy to the values 
used as land inputs, as well as to the differences between 
tenure classes in variability of the marginal rates of sub-
stitution. 
For a similar output for all tenure classes, the total 
value (costs) of resources required on the average live-
stock-share farm is considerably less than the quantities 
required on farms of the other tenure groups. This situ-
ation may stem either from management or product 
combination, or both, as factors that presumably are 
not independent of the tenure classification. 
The foregoing hypotheses require additional testing 
because of the aggregative nature of the analytical 
methods used. But, even with refinements of the meth-
ods used, it is suspected that further analysis of the 
traditional tenure classes may not show meaningful dif-
ferences in the use of resources. This is because of the 
various characteristics and tenure arrangements that 
affect production decisions in different ways within each 
class. First, evidence points toward the need for remov-
ing the effects of such factors as quality of labor, man-
agerial ability, capital position of the firm and work 
preferences that affect resource use and productivities 
and that are important to the extent to which they are 
functionally related to the age of farm operators. Sec-
ond, even if significant differences between tenure-age 
classes are observed, the specific reasons for the dif-
ferences as well as the reasons for the deviations of 
actual resource inputs from optimum quantities will not 
be identified. Therefore, the effects of tenure arrange-
ments that may generate compensating forces to cover 
up resource malallocations within a tenure-age class 
remain to be isolated through methods and procedures 
still to be developed. 
Relative Efficiencies of Farm Tenure Classes 
Intrafirm Resource Allocation 
• m 
BY WALTER G. MILLER, WALTER E. CHRYST AND HOWARD W. OTTOSON1 
An examination of the literature on land tenure sug-
gests that more information is needed about the effects 
of farm tenure on agricultural efficiency.2 Further de-
velopment of the techniques by which tenure-engen-
dered inefficiencies may be analyzed adequately is also 
needed. The study on which this report is based was 
undertaken to bring into sharper focus some of the 
analytical problems involved, and to provide a frame 
of reference for some of the empirical studies pertaining 
to the allocative efficiency of tenure arrangements. 
CURRENT TENURE-RELATED RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
PROBLEMS 
Many of the current problems in economics may be 
defined in terms of deviations of actual situations from 
one or more of the conditions (criteria) suggested by 
economic principles for optimum ( efficient) resource 
allocation. Certain tenure arrangements should be ex-
pected to account for at least a part of the deviations 
from optimum resource allocation that may be present 
within a farm. a But it has been well observed that " ..... . 
the nature of deviations from optimum (resource al-
location) are quite subtle and not immediately obvious 
from a cursory examination of American farms operat-
ing under different types of tenure arrangements."4 
Consequently, one problem is to determine what part 
of the deviations from optimum resource use can be at-
tributed to characteristics of the tenure system. The 
magnitudes of the deviations caused by tenure arrange-
ments arc unknown. Similarly, knowledge of the extent 
to which tenure arrangements facilitate or impede opti-
mum adjustments in resource use is lacking. However, 
'Walter G. Miller and Walter E. Chryst are agricultural economists, Farm 
Economics Research Division. Agricultural Research Service, U. S. De"t. 
of Agriculture. Howard W. Ottoson is an agricultural economist, Nebraska 
Agricultural Experiment Station. The contributions of the Subcommittee 
on Relative EHiciencies of Alternative Tenure Arrangements of the North 
Central Land Tenure Research Committee in planning the study and 
evaluating the results are acknowledged. These members include, 10 ad-
dition to the authors, Drs. Joseph Ackennan. Marshall Harris, Virgil 
Hurlburt, D. Gale Johnson, Frank Miller, Wilfred H. Pine, Philip M. 
Raup, S. D. Staniforth and John F. Timmons. The authors also WISh to 
thank Professor C. B. Baker for his helpful suggestions. 
2For a statement on specific research needs in land tenure See the Inler-
regional Land Tenure Research Committee's .. port: Agricultural land 
tenure research. scope and nature: reappraisal, 1955. Farm Foundation, 
Chicago, III. 1955. 
'In terms of ef£icienC)', the basic problem in resource allocation may be 
defined in one of two ways: (1) For a given level of resource use WIthin 
a firm, the associated value of production is not being maximized; or con-
versely, (2) for a given level of production, the associated costs are not 
being minimized. 
'D. Gale Johnson. Resource allocatioQ I,"der 5hare contracts. Jour. Polito 
Econ. 58: 11+. 1950. 
some clues have been obtained from previous empirical 
observations. It has been observed that some of the cur-
rent farm rental practices in the Midwest are not in 
accord with those that would constitute an optimum 
on the basis of theory.5 In other studies it has been 
found that there are differences in the way resources 
are used by farmers operating under different methods 
of rental payment.6 Although no attempt was made in 
these studies to "measure" the deviations from opti-
mum arising from tenure relationships, they do provide 
some evidence that there could be divergencies between 
the actual and the ideal in resource organization on 
rented farms. 
But tenure inefficiencies are not a function of leasing 
arrangements alone; owner-operators as well may make 
decisions under tenure-oriented conditions that moti-
vate departures from optimum resource use.7 These 
sources of inefficiencies would be expected to differ 
from those on fully rented farms. For instance, unde'r 
owner-operatorship, inefficiencies may be caused part-
ly by capital rationing or by fixed and regressive taxes, 
interest charges and amortization rates. Supposedly, 
in the case of tenancy, additional inefficiencies are in-
troduced by certain methods of sharing costs and re-
turns or short-term contracts. But these "imperfections" 
in leasing arrangements may be mitigated by such char-
acteristics of tenancy as the joint contributions of land-
lord and tenant to the total farm assets and the sharing 
of uncertainties. 
Apart from discovering resource malaIIocations that 
can be attributed to tenure, measures to improve re-
source use are contingent upon isolating the effects of 
specific types of tenure arrangements.s Theoretical ex-
planations that have been advanced in the literature 
on tenure economics represent mere predictions about 
'Virgil L. Hurlburt. Farm rental I'mctices and problems in the Midwest. 
North Central Reg. Land Tenure Res. Com., North Cent. Reg. Pub!. 50. 
1954. (Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 416). 
'!teference is ~ade. to the following studies: Earl 9. Heady and Earl W. 
Kerberg. RelallOnslup of crop-share and cash leasmg systems to farming 
efficiency .. Iowa. i\gr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 386. 1952'; Lee Monroe Day. 
Compat;allVe ef£,c.ency of farm. operators. under. alternativ!, leasin~ systems. 
Unpubhshe~ Ph.D. theSIS. UnlV. of MID!'. L,brary, Mmneapohs, Minn. 
1953; l\£arvm W. Kottke. A study of decISIon sharIng, t.nure uncertainty 
an? the choice of farm enterprise combinations under leasing systems in 
Mmn.sota. Unpublished Ph.D. Ihesi •. Univ. of Minn. Library Minneapolis 
Minn. 1955; Alvin C. Egbert. A study of resource tlse on .,'rop-share and 
liveslock-share rentrd farms in central Kentucky. Unpublished M.S. 
thesis. Univ. of Ky. Library, Lexington, Ky. 1955. 
'Cf. rnterr.gional Land Tenure Research Committee, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
'Referred to as sl!ecific types of tenure arrangements are such condition. 
as terms o[ amortIZation or tax payments, terms used for sharing costs and 
returns On rented farms, Or the length of lease.. ' • 
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empirical relationships whose validity must be estab-
lished before they can serve as sound bases for action. 
Among the difficulties faced in the analysis of empi-
rical data on tenure are those of identification and 
measurement. First, the extent of deviations from 
specified optimum conditions should be determined. 
Further, the effects of specific tenure arrangements, 
such as methods of sharing costs and/or products and 
effects of "tenure status" of farm operators on the or-
ganization of resources need to be estimated. Thus, the 
estimation of cause and effect relationships within a 
tenure system has as one of its prerequisites the choice 
of appropriate analytical models. 
PROBLEMS INVESTIGATED 
The specific problems for this study involve the ef-
fects of the tenure status of farm operators on resource 
allocation within the firm. These effects were exam-
ined under owner-operatorship and under livestock-
share and crop-share-cash leasing. 
Existing theories, as well as previous empirical studies, 
suggest that the selected tenure classes cause actual re-
source organization to depart from the conditions nec-
essary for efficient production within a farm firm.o 
This analysis was concerned with departures from two 
of these conditions: (1) the optimum levels of resource 
inputs and (2) the optimum combination of resources 
for a given level of production. These conditions apply 
to all firms and may serve as the standards for evaluat-
ing the extent to which farm firms allocate resources 
efficiently.lo A major analytical problem was then one 
of detecting the deviations of actual patterns of resource 
use from the optimum conditions by the tenure classes. 
No attempt was made in the study reported here to 
isolate the effects of intratenure class sources of inef-
ficiencies, such as tenure-engendered rationing of capi-
tal; "imperfections" in leasing arrangements or other 
more specific tenure-oriented obstacles to efficiency. 
Nor were the kinds of action necessary to minimize ob-
served inefficiencies treated. 
OBJECTIVES OF INVESTIGATION 
In view of the reasons for which this analysis was 
undertaken, the study was partly methodological. Con-
sequently, the immediate objectives were twofold: (1) 
to gain further insight into the relationships between 
the tenure status of farm operators and the use and 
productivities of land, labor and capital services used 
in Iowa and northern Illinois, the area from which data 
were obtained and (2) to evaluate the usefulness of 
single equatio~s for estimating and comparing effici-
'Granting the usual assumptions that the. agricultural finn ope.rates under 
perfect competition a,nd seeks. to m,!,,~m"'e net ~e!ums from !nvestments, 
the three basic criteria to gUide declSlo,!s for effiCient productIon m!'y be 
restated as follows: (I) exte'ld the .ervlce~ of a resource to. the pomt at 
which the value of the ptargmal product !' equal. to the p'rlce of the re-
source service; (2) substitute resourc~ services until !he ratIo ?f the value 
of the marginal prod!'ct of each palr of resourcc. IS prOPOrtiOnal to the 
respective resource prices· and (3) allocate resource services between com· 
petltlve products so that' the values of their marginal products are equal. 
10Ther. may be limitations to a universal application of an efficiency goal 
because the "extra·market values" sometimes attached to the ownership 
of land may be competitive with. efficient resOurce use, or '?'1.e may prefer 
to forego income (work) (or leisure. But the goal of eff,CIency can be 
justified on at least two grounds: (I) it is useful for operational purposes 
and (2) peopl~ ordinarily do prefer "more" to "less." 
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('ncy in resource use within farms operated under dif-
'ferent tenure classifications. 
THE STUDY AREA 
The data on which the following analysis is based 
were obtained by personal interview at 3-month inter-
vals during 1954 from a stratified random san;ple of 
588 farmers in Iowa and the northern two-thIrds of 
Illinois. The sample was originally designed to obtain 
data on livestock production only; however, data on the 
tenure of the farm operator were obtained also. In ad-
dition sufficient information on resources used and pro-
ductidn activities for the 1954 production year were 
obtained to make possible the estimation of production 
functions for each tenure group. 
Thus, although the sample was not originally de-
signed for the analysis reported here, the results ob-
tained are representative of an important part of the 
Com Belt. The data used were fairly complete and 
probably as accurate as can be obtained through field 
surveys. (Further details on the sample design are pre-
sented in Appendix A.) 
ANALYTICAL ApPROACH 
_ The study reported here. differs from pr~vious stu~ies 
in at least two respects. First, the a prIOrI assumptIOn 
that the owner-operator class of tenure represents a 
"standard" against which the performances of other 
classes may be appraised, was relaxed. Ins~ead! the goals 
of "optima" in the amounts and combmatIon or re-
sources were used to measure the levels of efficiency 
attained, regardless of the tenure status ,!f. the fa~m 
operator. Second, previous resource-productiVIty stu~hes 
have compared qualitatively only the levels of margmal 
returns of each resource with their respective prices. 
Conclusions with regard to resource malallocations have 
been drawn by inference. In the analysis that f?llo~s, 
.estimates were made of the extent of malalIocatlOns m 
terms of deviations from optimum resource combina-
tions for.given levels of production. In addition, a com-
parison of the estimated values of productive services 
required by each tenure class for the same level of pro-
duction was made to give further evidences of rela-
tive efficiencies. 
The analytical model used in estimating the degree 
of effectiveness (in terms of achieving efficiency) of the 
respective tenure classes rested heavily on statistical 
"production functions" fitted to the cross-section data 
used. Marginal returns for each resource were estimated 
and analyzed by tenure classes. Next, estimates were 
made of the extent of deviations from the optimum re-
source combination for each tenure class. Concomit-
antly, the types of adjustments that would improve re-
source organization were suggested. The value of the 
analytical model used was also assessed. 
METHOD OF INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS 
The two common approaches to the analysis of ef-
ficiency in contemporary agricultural economics re-
search are: (1) studies of the economics of specific farm 
situations and (2) studies of statistical populations (If 
farms. The latter approach only is followed here. It is 
proposed that groups of farms classified by the criterion 
of the tenure status of the operator are different popu-
lations. The parameters and relationships derived for 
each population are taken to represent those of the 
average farm within each group. 
HYPOTHESES DIRECTING THE INQUIRY 
Many propositions have been advanced about the ef-
fects of tenure arrangements and the tenure status of 
farm operators on resource allocation within the firm.ll 
Empirical work in testing these propositions, however, 
has been limited. The present analysis is concerned with 
only a part of the problems of tenure in resource allo-
cation. No hypotheses of a "diagnostic" nature that re-
late to the specific reasons for existence of the problems 
were tested. The empirical phases of the study were 
restricted to a test of these major hypotheses: (1) That 
levels of resource use are affected differently by the 
tenure status of farm operators. These differences are 
reflected in the patterns of marginal returns to the re-
sources employed. (2) That the departures from 
the optimum combination of land, labor and capital 
services at given levels of production differ according 
to the tenure status of farm operators. 
An examination of the broad tenure classes may have 
inherent weaknesses for analytical purposes because of 
the variations of tenure arrangements within these 
classes of farm operators that affect production deci-
sions. Nevertheless, the conventional classification was 
used in the present study as a matter of convenience. 
If production decisions vary considerably between the 
selected tenure classes, there should be differences 
among them in the patterns of resource use. It was sup-
posed that in the allocation of resources there would 
be sufficient homogeneity within, and heterogeneity be-
tween, the populations considered ,to reveal significant 
differences. 
METHODS USED FOR TESTING HYPOTHESES 
In testing the hypotheses, the analytical techniques 
included (1) the estimation of marginal returns to re-
sources and (2) an approximation of optimum resource 
combinations and the deviations of actual resource in-
puts from estimated optimum quantities. Actually, av-
erage intrafarm relationships were estimated from in-
terfarm or cross-section data. Consequently, it should 
be recognized that the estimates obtained are not the 
true empirical counterparts of the theoretical concepts 
of intrafarm relationships and resource productivities; 
they are reasonable approximations. It follows that esti-
mates of resource deviations from the optima are also 
approximations. 
FORM OF THE BASIC ESTIMATING EQUATIONS 
The basic estimating equations used are popularly 
"See (or example: Rainer Schickele. Leases and (arming efficiency. Jour. 
Farm Econ. 24: 112-127. 1941; T. W. Schultz. Capital rationing, UnCer-
tainty and (arm tenancy reform. Jour. Polit. Econ. 48: 309-324. 1940; 
Johnson op. cit.; Earl O. Heady. Economics o( agricultural production 
and res~urce use. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York. 1952. Ch. 20-22; S. V. 
Ciriacy .. \Vantrup. Resource conservation: economics and policies. Univ. 
of Calif. Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. 1952. Ch. 12, 13; Howard W. 
Ottoson. Application of efficiency to farm lenure arrangements. Jour. 
Farm Econ. 37: 1341-1353. 1955. 
known as the Cobb-Douglas type.12 They have been 
used extensively in resource productivity studies but 
only to a minor extent in the analysis of tenure effici-
ency specificalIy.13 The functions derived were of the 
form, ...;.-: ... ,': 
A 
A 
Y 
in which Y - estimated gross production in dollars, Xl 
= land in dollars, Xz = labor in weeks, and X3 = 
capital services in dollars. The compositions of these 
variables were as follows: 
Y refers to the sum of sales of livestock and livestock prod-
ucts, home-used livestock and livestock products, change in 
livestock inventory and value of crop production for thc year, 
less livestock purchases during the year." 
X, refers to the "market value" of land used (input), as 
quoted by the respondent-owner-operator or tenant. 
X. refers to labor, measured in weeks, which is a sum of: 
operators', hired and family labor, and 20 percent of the 
amount paid for custom work ($40 to equal 1 week)." 
X. refers to an estimate of capital services (flows) which 
is the sum of the money values for seeds, fertilizer, lime, in-
secticides, grains, silage, hay and commercial feeds, veterinary 
expenses and building repairs; 20 percent for depreciation on 
machinery; 3 percent of livestock purchased during the year; 
and 6 percent of the beginning inventory of livestock (January 
1954 ). 
ESTIMATION OF RESOURCE MARGINAL RETURNS 
Marginal returns to land, labor and capital services 
were estimated from the basic estimating equations. The 
marginal return to resource Xi is, by definition: 
A A 
ay laX i = bi Y IX i • 
Differences between the marginal returns, estimated 
at the geometric means, and the respective resource 
prices were used as first approximations of existing in-
efficiencies.16 Any difference between the price of a re-
source and its marginal return was accepted as evidence 
of inefficiency, with "the magnitude of the difference ... 
a clue to the extent of inefficiency."17 The difference 
in the marginal returns between tenure classes may 
arise from one or more causes: (1-) differences in the 
quality of the resource employed under each tenure 
"In the study reported here the (unctions were derived (or each tenure 
class through weighted least squares because the data fitted Were obtained 
through a sample stratified by (arm size (classes I, 2 and 3) with dif-
ferent sampling proportions applied to each class. The data and weighting 
process used are discussed in Appendix A. 
"Egbert, loco cit.; Day, loco cit.; Earl O. Heady. Marginal reSOurce pro-
ductivhy and imputation of shares for a sample of tented farms. Jour. 
Polito Econ. 36: 500-511. 1955. The usage of the function in resource 
productivity studies can be accounted for by certain considerations as noted 
by Gerhard Tintner. A note on the derivatIon of production functions from 
farm records. Econometrica. 12: 26-27. 1944. 
"This aggre!!,ation was unavoidable because no infonnation was available 
on the diviSIon of the reSOurces used between enterprises. A separate func-
tion for each major enterprise would give greater comparability between 
the relationships and estimate. made. 
15The aggregation of these categories of labor i. probably a limiting feature 
as it implies homogeneity o( the different labor services. 
'''These prices were estimated opportunity cost. o( 6 percent per rear 
for land, $40 per week (or labor and 10 percent per year for capital servIces. 
"George J. Stigler. The theory of price. Rev. ed. The Macmillan Co., 
New York. 1954. p. 102. The concept of "opportunity cost" (alternative 
cost) was applied to make the necessary comparisons; i.e., the cost o( 
a productive service in a given use is equal to the larges~ val"" of the 
mars-inal product of tha~ service in its other possible uses, 
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TABLE I. AGE. DISTRIllUTION OF r'ARM OPERATORS WITHIN 
EACH TENURE CLASS. 
Age interval Owner-
operators 
(years) percent 
7U and over ........ ___ .......... _______ .. __ 6.2 
65-69 ... ___________________ : ____________ ... ________ 6.6 
60-64 _______________ ........ _______ .... ___________ . 9.9 
55-59 _________ .. _ .. _____________ . __________________ 20.0 
50-54 .... _____ . _____________ .. ______________ . ____ .. 19.3 
~5-49 __________________ .. _______ .. ___________ .. ____ 14.6 
40-44 __ .. ______ .... ____________ .. __________________ 10.8 
35-39 _ .. ____ .... _________________________________ .. 5,4 
30-34 ______________________________________________ 3.7 
25-29 .... __ .... ____________________________________ 3,4 
24 and under .. _______________________ .. _ 1.0 
Totals _________________ .. _______________ .. 100_0 
Age distribution 
Livestock-
share renters 
percent 
0.4 
0.0 
1.4 
4.6 
4.6 
4.9 
16.2 
19.0 
31.0 
15.1 
2.8 
100.0 
Crop-share-
cash renters 
percent 
0.0 
2.2 
3.9 
4_8 
11.8 
13.8 
14.0 
15.5 
20.5 
13.5 
0.0 
I {)(J. 0 
class, (2) differences in the levels and combinations of 
resources and (3) differences in combinations of prod-
uctS. 18 
It is suggested that as the age distribution is more 
negatively skewed for owner-operators (table 1 and 
fig. 1), the quality of labor under owner-operatorship 
should be inferior to that of the two tenant classes.19 
In view of the differentials in age distribution be-
tween tenure classes, marginal returns to labor might 
vary between these classes. to the extent that age is 
negatively correlated with labor quality and that the 
greater proportion of the farm labor is performed by 
the operator himself.20 To make some observations on 
the age factor (and attempt to minimize its effects) es-
timates were made also for two age groups of owner-
operators, in addition to those for owners as a whole, 
from estimating equations derived separately for each 
lS1farginal returns will be the same for the tenure classes only if their 
hasic estimating equations are identical with "constant· returns to scale" 
and each. class is, on the average) operating at the optima, using the same 
set of prices as the choice criterion. 
l!)Thc quality of land may vary also between tenure types; however in this 
study, land units arc "standardized" in terms of market value. n'ut since 
the values used are obtained from tenants as well' as owners, one can sus· 
pcct "subjective underestimation" by tenants on the average. If the "under-
evaluation" is uniform) the cstimated elasticity of land need not be affected. 
'"Most of the farm production functions fitted have failed to yield regres-
sion coefficients for labor that differed significantly from zero. But no 
observations have been made on thc relationships that might exist between 
the quality of lahor, as affected by age, and the sizes of these coefficients. 
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Fig. 1. Ase distribution of farm operators within each tenure class. 
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age group. The two groups selected were (1) owners 
under 45 years of age and (2) owners over 54, with 
the hypothesis that the older group would show a 
marginal return to labor lower than that of any other 
tenure group analyzed. 21 
Differences in marginal returns arising from resource 
combinations can be detected only if the production 
surfaces (elasticities of production) are the same. To 
detect the effects of resource combinations on marginal 
returns, the individual regressions for livestock-share 
and crop-share-cash tenants were pooled to obtain pro-
duction elasticities for tenants as a group.22 It was 
supposed that these tenant classes had similar produc-
tion surfaces but, because of different resource combina-
tions, the marginal returns would be different_ 
ESTIMATION OF DEVIATIONS OF ACTUAL RESOURCE 
INPUTS FRO:\-I OPTIMUM RESOURCE COMBINATIONS 
The optimum combinations of resources were esti-
mated at the geometric means of output by using the 
basic estimating equation obtained for each tenure class. 
The objective was to solve for the condition where the 
ratios of the marginal return for each resource to the 
opportunity cost of the respective resource were equal. 
This equality of ratios, 
---, 
PI Pa Pa 
yields the lowest possible costs for the given level of 
production and resource "prices." In the equation, the 
subscripts 1, 2 and 3 denote the resources-land, labor 
and capital, respectively; bY IX represents the resource 
marginal return; and P represents the opportunity cost 
of the resource. The values for the resource inputs (XI) 
are the optimum quantities and were the unknowns.23 
The deviations from the optimum were considered to 
be the differences between the geometric means of the 
inputs and the estimated optimum inputs. 
The optimum solution -is analogous to equating the 
marginal rates of substitution of resources with the in-
verse of the respective price ratios. One difference is 
that opportunity costs are used instead of actual factor 
prices. From the basic estimating equation used, the 
marginal rate at which resource X j substitutes for XI 
is defined as 
oXi/oXI = bjXj/bjX i . 
The condition for optimum combination of resources 
requires that 
bjXi/bjXI = PI/Pj 
for all possible pairs of resources. Pi and Pj are, re-
21This assutnes that the "inferior" quality of labor is not counteracted by 
"superior" quality of management of the older operator. Intercorrcla-
tion, if present, may also affect the marginal returns to labor and thus con-
found any effect that could ,tern from the quality of labor. With cross-
section sampling data t the amount of labor used as reported by farmers 
may be relatively Hconstant." lIenee, labor hecomes the weaker variable 
and its effects on production may be reflected in some other regression co~ 
efficient. 
"The regression' were pooled by summing the weighted corrected ,urns of 
squares and cross products for each lease type to obtain coefficients Com-
mOn to both lease types. 
"The algebraic solution and computation 12rocedure used to determine the 
optimum resource inputs appear in AppendiX n. 
TABLE 2. REGRESSION CONSTANTS PRODUCTION ELASTICITIES AND CORRELATION INDEXES OF THE ESTIMATING EQUATION FOR 
, EACH TENURE CLASS.· 
Ten ure clas, Reg(ession 
constant 
(a) 
~~~:t~~{.~r:.~~rs re;;"i~~"':::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: J:Ugg 
Crop-share-cash renters ....................... _....................... 3.4166 
aThe estimating equation for owner .. operatoJ's, for example~ is 
Land 
(b.) 
0.1054 
0.2315 
0.2937 
Y == 1.7795 X,··'OM X,··"" X3··"·' 
Production elasticities 
Labor 
(h,) 
0.1109b 
0.1845 
0.2472 
Capital 
services 
(ba) 
0.8381 
0.5330 
0.4782 
Sum of 
elasticities 
(l:bl) 
1.0544 
0.9490 
1.0191 
Correlation 
index 
(R') 
0.735 
0.676 
0.728 
Wher~ X" X. and X. rdcr to thc quantities of I~,!d, labor and capital services, re.pectively. . ..' .. 
• Sigmficantly different from zero at the probabIlIty level of 10 to 20 percent. All other values are Slgmflcant at probahlhty levels of 10 percent and les •. 
spectively, the "prices" of resources Xl and Xj' Thus 
the deviations of the marginal rates of substitution of 
resources, . at the geometric means, from the inverse of 
the respective "price" ratios were used as a means of 
testing for inefficiencies in the combination of resources. 
BASIC EQUATIONS AND RESOURCE INPUTS 
USED FOR ESTIMATING MARGINAL RETURNS 
AND DEVIATIONS FROM OPTIMUM 
RESOURCE COMBINATIONS 
Estimates of marginal returns to land, labor and 
capital services and the estima~e~ of deviations of the~e 
resource inputs from the quantIties needed. for t~e 0I?tl-
mum combinations depend upon the baSIC estlmatmg 
equations derived. In addition, the estimates made for 
this report also depend upon the mean values of the 
resource inputs and production observed for each tenure 
class. Hence, a brief examination of the production 
elasticities (regression coefficients) and the other 
parameters obtained follows. 
PRODUCTION ELASTICITIES AND RELATED STATISTICS 
The production elasticities for land, labor and capit~l' 
services (table 2) represent the percentage change m 
the value of production associated with a 1-percent 
change in the respective resource input, assuming other 
inputs to be unchanged. The land elasticity b l , would 
then repres'ent the percentage increase in production 
associated with a 1-percent increase in the amount of 
land. 
It is noticeable (table 2) that differences between 
the elasticities of each resource for the two lease types 
are smaller than the differences that result when owner-
operators are cqmpared with either type of tenant. As 
a matter of contrast, a 1-percent increase in land re-
sults in a change of only 0.1054 percent in production 
for owner-operators as compared with 0.2937 percent 
for crop-share-cash renters. With respect to capit~l. ~erv­
ices, the relative values are .reversed-the elastICity of 
0.8381 for owner-operators IS remarkably larger than 
that of 0.4782 for crop-share-cash renters. One might 
then suspect that there are different "biases" in the 
elasticities obtained. For example, it is not unlikely that, 
under owner-operatorship, management is more highly 
intercorrelated with capital services and hence might 
result in a coefficient for capital larger than the coef-
ficients for the other groups.24 Furthermore, differences 
"See Glen L. Johnson. Problems in studying reSOUrCe productivities and 
size 01 business arising from managerial processes. In Earl O. Heady eI .1., 
c-ds. Resource productivity, returns to scale and farm size. Iowa State 
College Press, Ames, Iowa. 1956. p. 16-23. 
in elasticities may stem from the way in which products 
or factors were aggregated.25 The scale of operations, 
product combination and resource quality can also af-
fect the sizes of the elasticities; they are particularly 
important to the extent that they are not independent 
of tenure classification in this analysis. 
Except for the effects of labor quality, the causes for 
differences in the production elasticities obtained were 
not tested; the foregoing explanations are only tenta-
tive. With regard to labor, the relative sizes of the 
elasticities follow to some extent a pattern of age dis-
tribution previously shown (table 1 and fig. 1). When 
the age distribution is more negatively skewed (owner-
operators), the labor elasticity (0.1109) is small. When 
the age distribution is more positively skewed, the labor 
elasticities are larger (0.1845 for livestock-share renters 
and 0.2472 for crop-share-cash renters). 
As anticipated, the labor elasticity of 0.1719 for the 
younger age group of owner-operators is larger than 
that of 0.0171 for the older age group (table 3). It 
will be seen in table 4 that the difference of 0.1548 is 
not very significant (20 to 30 percent). But it is con-
sistent with logic. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTION 
ELASTICITIES 
Differences between owner-operators and both lease 
types in the production elasticities for land and capital 
services are highly significant, but those for labor are 
not. The two lease types do not differ significantly in 
any of the elasticities. 
Production elasticities for the younger owner-oper-
tors are more" similar to those of the lease types than 
are the elasticities of owner-operators as a whole. That 
is, the probability levels for the differences between 
tenant operators and owner-operators, as a whole, are 
greater than those for the differences between them 
:.5produc:tion elasticities are Uunstable" in the sense that if some resource 
category is regrouped, the elasticity of the "unregrouped" reSOurce (s) 
Inay be reduced or increased. Therefore J differences between tenure class("!ii 
in the elasticities at one le\'cl of resourCe aggregation need not be the 
same at another level of aggregation. For a further discussion on the gen .. 
eral problem 01 aggregation consult James S. Plaxico. Problems 01 factor-
p.-oduct aggregation in Cobb-Donglas . valne productivity analysi.. Jour. 
Farm Eeon. 37: 664-675. 1955. 
TABLE 3. REGRESSION CONSTANTS, PRODUCTION ELASTICITIES 
AND CORRELATION INDEXES OF THE ESTIMATING EQUATION 
FOR TWO AGE GROUPS OF OWNER-OPERATORS. 
Production elasticities Correla-
Age group Regression Capital Sum 01 tion 
of owner- constant Land Labor services ~Iasticities index 
"perator (a) (bl) (b.) (h,) (l:bl) (RZ) 
Under 45 years .... 4.0200 0.0919b 0.1719" 0.7351" 0.9989 0.761 
Over 54 years .... 2.6755 0.2239" 0.0171 0 0.6950· 0.9360 0.913 
-Significantly diflerent lrom zero at probability levels 01 less than 1 percent. 
.Significantly dilferent from zero at probabilIty level of 10 to 20 percent. 
CNonsignificant. 
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TABLE 4. VALUES OF t FOR DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTION 
ELASTICITIES BETWEEN TENURE GROUPS. 
Value of t for difference in 
production elasticities 
Tenure groups compared Land Labor Capital 
services 
All owner-operators and lease types 
Owner-operator vs. 
livestock-share renters .....•................ 7.15" 0.67 7.72' 
Owner-operators vs. 
crop-share-cash renters .................... 9.65< 
Livestock-share Vs. 
1.04 12.01-
crop-share-cash renters .................... 1.08' 0.47 0.57 
Age groups of owne.-operators and lease types 
Owner-oj1erators: age under 45 VS. 
livestock-.hare renters ...................... 1.99· 0.12 1.50· 
Owner-operators: age under 45 VS. 
crop-share-cash renters .................... 2.67b 
Owner-operators: age under 45 VB. 
age over 54 years ............... _............. .' 1. 70d 1.09' 
0.59 1.86d 
0.43 
<Significant at a probability level less than 0.1 percent. 
"Significant at a probability level of 0.1 to I percent. 
<Significant at a probability level of I to 5 percent. 
dSignificant at a probability level of 5 to 10 percent. 
·Significant at a probability level of 10 to 20 percent. 
'Significant at a probability level of 20 to 30 percent. 
All other values of t are nonsignificant at probability levels of 30 percent· 
and less. 
and owner-operators of the younger group. It would 
thus appear that if age were held constant, the analysis 
of relative efficiencies of tenure classes would be im-
proved. More useful information should be obtained 
if the same age groups in different tenure classes were 
compared rather than a cross-section sample of. tenure 
classes disregarding the age factor. 
Apart from the possible effects of the qualities of 
labor and management, further consideration of "age 
effects" is also important to the extent that the age of 
an operator is not independent of the capital position 
of the firm and work preferences. These factors are 
not peculiar to any form of tenure, hence they might 
distort the results if they are not taken into account. 
The production surfaces for livestock-share and crop-
share-cash renters are assumed to be the same. This as-
sumption is based on the logic that if the individual 
elasticities of all the factors do not differ between tenure 
classes significantly (table 4) then the production sur-
faces are the same. Therefore, the individual elasticities 
were pooled to obtain those common to both lease types 
(table 5).26 . 
It may be noted that the production elasticities of 
the pooled regression are about the average of those for 
the individual regressions, which are presented again 
in table 5. The more important observation, however, 
concerns the relative values for the correlation indexes 
(R2 and R'2). The variation in production under live-
stock-share accounted for by the pooled regression is 
"The way in which the pooling was done was explained previously. 
only 0.3 percent less than that accounte? ~or by the 
individual regression. Similarly, the vanatlOn under 
crop-share-cash accounted for by the pooled regression 
is only 0.1 percent less. Therefore, the amount of con-
fidence one may place in the estimates is not substan-
tially reduced by pooling the individual regressions. 
GEOMETRIC MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND 
RESOURCE INPUTS 
The resource inputs shown in table 6 are not unex-
pected. It is noticeable that except for the y?~nger 
owners with 91 weeks of labor, the mean quantItIes of 
labor employed are quite comparable. Apparently the 
similarities arise from the constant nature of operator 
and family labor. Between farms, the close comparisons 
may reflect a weakness in the way labor services ~re 
measured, specifically with re9ard to the assu~~tlOn 
of homogeneity of labor services employed wlthm a 
farm. However, with these data, differences in resource 
ratios should arise mainly from differences in the quan-
tities of land and capital services used in combination 
with labor. 
The possible tenure-oriented sources for differences 
in the resource ratios are these: (1) "imperfections" 
in share leasing arrangements, as nonoptimum sharing 
of costs and returns; (2) capital rationing so far as it 
causes restrictions in the quantities of land and/or 
capital services used in relation to labor; and (3) use 
of the rental device by farmers as a means of getting 
control of greater quantities of land and capital serv-
ices. On share-rented farms, the first and third sources 
logically operate in opposite directions: the first is re-
strictive in use of capital services while the third en-
ables use of greater quantities of capital services 
through the sharing of uncertainties and the joint con-
tributions of landlord and tenant to the total farm 
assetsY Related to this point is the observation that 
owner-operators show the smallest quantities of both 
land and capital services (table 6). 
As would be expected, the land/labor and land/-
capital ratios of $352 per week and $4.40 per dollar 
of capital services, respectively, under owner-opera tor-
ship are smaller than those under any other group of 
operators. This suggests a greater intensity of use of 
both labor and capital with respect to land. The rea-
sons for this situation are two-fold: (1) owner-oper-
"Logically, the aggregation of capital into a single productive se!,,:ice te!,ds 
to conceal diVerences betw~en tenure group~ Ill. t~e ,",se .of sPoecIllc capItal 
items as fertihzer and machmery, as well a. mefftclencles tn. dIfferent phases 
of farm operations. . 
TABLE 5. REGRESSION CONSTANTS, PRODUCTION ELASTICITIES AND RELATED STATISTICS OF "INDIVIDUAL" AND "POOLED" 
ESTIMATING EQUATIONS FOR TWO LEASE TYPES. 
Lease type 
Livestock-share 
renters ........................................................................... . 
Crop-share-cash 
renters ........................................................................... . 
Livestock-share 
renters ................................................................ . 
Crop-share-cash 
renters ................................................ a ......................... . 
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Regression 
constant 
(a) 
6.4759 
3.4166 
(a') 
4.7327 
3.8950 
Production elasticities 
Land 
(bl) 
0.2315 
0.2937 
(b l ') 
0.2708 
0.2708 
CaPital 
Labor servIces 
Individual regression estimates 
(b,) (b,) 
0.1845 0.5330 
0.2472 0.4782 
Pooled regression estimates 
(b,') (b.') 
0.2237 0.5026 
0.2237 0.5026 
Sum of Correlatioll 
elasticities index 
(l:bl) (R2) 
0.9490 0.676 
1.0191 0.728 
(l:bl') (R") 
0.9971 0.673 
0.9971 0.727 
TABLE 6. GEOMETRIC MEANS OF GROSS PRODUCTION AND RESOURCE INPUTS..! AND RESOURCE RATIOS BY TENURE CLASSES AND 
BY TWO AGE GROUPS OF OWNER-OPt.RATORS. 
Geometric means Resource ratios 
Tenure group 
g~~s~~~{.:h~~~r~e,:;ie~s··:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Crap-share-cash renters .......•......................•......•..•.....•..... 
Owner-operators: age 
Production 
(1$) 
12,697 
22,936 
15,105 
Landa 
2n04 
45,884 
41,506 
Capital 
Labor services 
('7:) 
77· 
76 
($) 
6,230 
9,566 
6,517 
91 
Land Capital Land 
!;ilio;" ~ capital 
($/wk) 
352.0 
($/wk) 
80.0 
($/$) 
4.4 
596.0 124.0 4.8 
546.0 86.0 6.4 
303.0 97.0 3.1 under 45 ................................................................................ 17,714 
O:;~::-5f~~~.~~~.' ... ~.~.~............................................................... 10,690 25,924 72 
27,551 8,794 
5,188 360.0 72.0 5.0 
aThe areas represented by these land values are roughly as follows: 143 acres for owner-operators, 
crop-share-cash renters. 
180 acres for livestock-share renters and 184 acres for 
ators have no intrafirm dissociations of costs and re-
turns and ordinarily would tend to push the use of re-
sources to. a further extent than would operators under 
share leases; but (2) under owner-operatorship the 
funds available to acquire more land may be inade-
quate. The first reason is conducive to efficiency; the 
second is not. The latter may result in excess labor in 
relation to the total stock of farm assets, land or capital. 
The smallest capital/labor ratio of $80 per week for 
owner-operators appears to bear out the foregoing 
point. 
The data in table 6 show also that the amounts of 
land and capital services used under owner-opera tor-
ship are less than those used by the other groups of 
farmers. That is, under owner-operatorship, the amount 
of land used may have been restricted because of limited 
funds. Thus, the low land/labor ratio need not be due 
to the incentive of owner-operators to extend the use 
of labor services further than other groups. 
Significantly, the greatest land/labor and capital/· 
labor ratios (of $596 per week and $124 per week, re-
spectively) are associated with farms operated under 
livestock-share contracts. Again, these observations 
would confirm the theories that surround livestock-
share leases. In the first place, the effects of capital 
rationing are reduced to a "minimum." Both landlord 
and tenant contribute to the acquisition of farm as-
sets. But, in addition, and in contrast to the usual crop-
share-cash contracts, the presence of landlords in the 
farm operations minimizes the restrictive effects of ex-
ternal rationing of capital. 
In terms of land/capital combination, the estimate 
of $4.80 of land for each dollar of capital services for 
livestock-share renters is interesting. The ratio is simi-
lar to the ratio of $4.40 per dollar for owner-operators. 
The two groups are equally intensive in the use of 
capital services per unit of land. This assumes that the 
land values reported by owner-operators are compar-
able to those reported by tenants; but this need not be 
the case. Tenants might be expected to "undervalue" 
the land they operate. 
A comparison of the land/capital ratio of $6.40· per 
dollar for crop-share-cash tenants and that of $4.80 
per dollar for livestock-share tenants suggests that there 
is less capital restriction under livestock-share leasing. 
Other things being equal, this observation would pos-
sibly verify the hypothesis that the nonoptimum sh?-r-
ing of costs and returns under crop-share-cash leasmg 
caused restrictions in the use of capital services. In the 
case of livestock-share farms, all costs of "variable 
capital" are usually shared and in the same propor-
tion-50 percent-as the sharing of products. 
The reasons for the smaller land/labor ratio-$546-
per week for crop-sha,.re-cash renters as compared with 
$596 per week for livestock-share renters are not those 
suggested by theory. The intensity of labor should be 
less if the costs of labor are not shared proportionately 
with production or if no compensatory adjustments are 
provided for by the sharing of other costs. That is if 
the share tenant is not rewarded for the full marginal 
value product (through the sharing of production) of 
his labor, he is inclined to restrict its application.28 
The seeming contradiction of empirical observation and 
theoretical expectations is negated when the land/labor 
ratios are transformed (from dollars per week) to acres 
per week. The land/labor ratio of 2.4 acres per week 
(table 7) for crop-share-cash is slightly greater than 
the ratios of 2.3 acres per week for livestock-share 
renters. This difference is intuitively negligible; hence 
it might be inferred that, on the average, there are real-
ly no differences between these types in land-labor com-
binations. 
In summary, the differences observed between the 
tenure classes in resource ratios are largely what one 
would expect. With lower land/labor and capital/-
labor ratios for owner-operators, the marginal produc-
tivity of labor can be expected to be low, and returns 
to land and capital high relative to that of labor. A 
lower land/capital ratio would suggest a lower marginal 
productivity of capital in relation to that of land. How-
ever, resource productivities also depend upon the rela-
tive values of the elasticities of production. 
In addition, the marginal productivity of labor for 
livestock-share renters is expected to be higher than 
that for any other group, partly because of the higher 
land/labor and capital/labor ratios. Conversely, the 
marginal productivity of land and capital should be 
relatively low. But these estimates depend also on the 
effects of the land/capital ratio, the coefficients of all 
the resources and the constant of the basic estimating 
equation. An examination of the marginal returns to 
resources which follows shows that only the marginal 
return to capital is relatively low; that for labor is the 
highest of all groups. Differences in resource ratios are 
"However the differences observed could well b. due to differences in 
the pallcr'n of J?raduction that might (but need not) be functionally re-
lated to the 1easmg arrangements. It could also be argued that the assump-
tion of homogeneity of labor services distorts these comparisonsi but it 
can be further assumed that errors of this kind arc the same within each 
tenure class~ 
TABLE 7. LAND·LABOR AND LAND-CAPITAL RATIOS IN TERMS 
OF ACRES BY TENURE CLASSES. 
Resource ratios 
Land 
Tenure classes Labor 
Land 
Capital 
(A./$) 
0.023 
0.019 
0.028 
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only rough indices of differences in resource organiza-
tions. 2D 
INEFFICIENCIES OBSERVED THROUGH THE 
PATTERNS OF RESOURCE MARGINAL 
RETURNS 
Clues to inefficient resources use are obtained from 
examination of marginal returns to each resource and 
comparisons of these marginal returns with the oppor-
tunity costs of the respective resources. If the ratio of 
a marginal return to the resource price is greater than 
unity, it is indicative that the resource is limitational 
and could be profitably extended in use; or if it is 
lower than unity it means that the use of that resource 
should be contracted if improved efficiency is desired. 
Thus the condition for efficient resource use with 
which a part of the analysis is concerned sets the limits 
to which resources should be extended, or contracted, 
to obtain optimum production levels. However, under 
the phenomenon of increasing or constant returns to 
the scale of operation, there are no determinate opti-
mum quantities of resources if the amounts of all re-
sources are increased. 30 Consequently, the following 
analysis on the deviations from optimum levels of pro-
duction (with the associated amounts of resources) is 
largely qualitative in character. 
LEVELS OF MARGINAL RETURNS TO RESOURCES 
Marginal return or marginal value product (table 8) 
is the additional return per unit of input if one more 
unit of the resource were added at the geometric means. 
On the premise that the different production elastici-
ties are peculiar to the tenure classes, a part of the 
analysis on marginal returns is based on the individual 
estimating equations.31 Next, an attempt is made to in-
dicate the possible effects of labor quality on the mar-
ginal productivity estimates as suggested by the dif-
ferentials in age distributions. Finally, differences in 
marginal returns that could be attributed more spe-
cifically to resource combinations of the lease types 
are analyzed by using the coefficients from the pooled 
regression. 
29If production elasticities diCIer between tenure groups, the inferences 
drawn in terms of resource ratios may be misleading. The marginal pro-
ductivity of a resource depends on the levels of the resource inputs as 
well as the sizes of the elasticities. Even if resource combinations (ratios) 
arc the same, the estimates on marginal returns and dcvhtions will vary 
between tenure classes if the basic estimating equations are different. 
30Except for livestock .. share renters, increasing returns to scale arc ob· 
served for, all tenure classes. (The sums of the elasticities-table 9-are 
greater than unity). Thus a calculated optimum of production would be 
infinitely large. If constant returns to scale prevail, the solution also be-
comes indeterminate. Thus, there i. no optimum level of production with 
constant Or increasing returns unless at least one resource is held fixp.d 
in quantity. The sum of the elasticities of the n:Sources varied must be 
If'S! than One. But, witb a resource fixed in quantity and the use of other 
resources extended (or contracted) the optimum obtaincd would be mOn~ 
analogous to that for the "shott run," which is not of immediate COIl-
eCl'n here. Other reasons for exercising caution in finding optimum lcve!s 
of IJroduction are that estimates removed from the means are subject to 
larger standard errors, and there is the possibility of extrapolatiollj Le., 
going beyond the range of the data. 
31The statistic used to test for inefficiencies (tabl. 8) was 
MI - PI t=---
s(ml) 
in which M 1 is the marginal return of a rcs(J~rce at the geometric means; 
PI is the opportunity cost for the respective resource, XI; and s(ml) 
is the standard errOr of the marginal return that was obtained from the 
variance formula shown in Appendix C. If the diClerence M I - PI is 
not significantly dif!er~nt from. zero, it implies. that the m~rginal.r~t';r,!. 
ol'portuDlty-cost raho IS not different from UnIty. The ratio of UnIty IS 
tho "criterion of efficiency" u,ed in this part of the analysis. 
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TABLE 8. MARGINAL RETURNS AND MARGINAL RETURN OP-
PORTUNITY-COST RATIOS AT THE GEOMETRIC MEANS OF 
RESOURCE INPUTS AND RELATED VALUES OF t FOR THE 
DIFFERENCE OF THE RATIOS FROM UNITY BY TENURE 
CLASSES. 
Tenure class Land 
Marginal 
Owner'operators ..................... , .......... J~tt$J 
Live,tock-share renters .................... 0.116 
Crop-share-cash renters .................. 0.107 
L.bor 
returns to resources 
(S/wk) 
17.96 
54.79 
48.98 
Capital 
services 
(SIS) 
1.708 
1.278 
1.108 
Marginal-return-opportunity-cost ratios· 
Owner-operatoro .................... , ........... 0.82 0.45 1.55 
LivestocK-share rente ....................... 1.93 1.36 1.16 
Crop-share-cash renter, .... , ............... 1.78 1.23 1.01 
Values of t for differences of the ratios 
from unity 
Owner-operators ................................ 0.58 1.75. 
LivI·stocIi·share renters .................... 2.69h 0.64 
Crop-share-cash renters .................... 2.99.. 0.42 
3.90" 
1.07d 
0.06 
aAs a reminder, the opportunity costs assurned were 6 percent for land, 
~~ ~: week for labo~ .and 10 percent fol' capital services. 
SignIficant at a probability level less than 1 percent. 
"Significant at a probability level of 5 to 10 percent. 
dSignificant at a probability level of 20 to 30 ecrcent. 
Other values of t are nonsignificant at probability levels of 50 percent or less. 
MARGINAL RETURNS UNDER OWNER-OPERATORS HIP 
The rather high marginal return of 70.8 percent to 
capital services under owner-operatorship (table 8) sug-
gests that on the average capital services is the limiting 
resource for owner-operators. To increase net returns, 
it means that the use of capital could be extended un-
til its marginal return equals (or approaches) the as-
sumed opportunity cost of 10 percent. With such an 
increase in the use of capital, the productiv,ities of both 
land and labor that are now below their opportunity 
costs of 6 percent and $40 per week, respectively, 
would be increased. 
The present pattern of resource productivities then 
suggests that owner-operator farms have excess labor 
but are short on capital services. Superficially, land ap-
pears also to be in excess, but the marginal return is 
not significantly below 6 percent (table 8).32 On the 
basis of these observations, one might conclude that 
capital rationing operates more to limit the use of 
capital services than to limit the use of land. In es-
sence, the findings would support the hypothesis that 
prior commitments to land purchases force restrictions 
in the use of capital services. Thus, the amount of 
capital used falls short of the amount that would be 
most profitable for the average owner-operator farm. 
MARGINAL RETURNS UNDER LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASING 
Unlike the .inferences drawn for owner-operators, 
there are no eVidences of resource excesses for livestock-
share renters. All the marginal returns here are above 
the opportunity costs of resources. It means that the 
use of all the resources might be extended profitably. 
However, it is noticeable (table 8) that the return to 
land is 93 percent above the "cost" of land (the highest 
of the tenure classes listed) and substantially above that 
of 36 percent for labor and 16 percent for capital serv-
ices. Consequently, from ~he standp<;>int of increasing net 
returns, through mcrease m product lOn, land is evidently 
"'Thi, nonsigniIican~ diff~re'}c.e, however, do~s not imply that the use 
of land d~s not differ. Slgmhcant\y. from 0l?tlmum for the present level 
of. production; the. optimum condltlOn requIres that, in order to mini-
mize costs, the ratIos of the resource margInal returns to the opportunity 
costs of the resources be equa!. Therefore, the marginal returns nced not 
be equal to the cost per umt of the resources, especially if increasing 
or constant returns to scale are present. 
the most "limitational" of the three resource categories. 
Further, the 1narginal return to land is significantly 
above its oppqrtunity cost at a probability level of less 
than 1 percent. Therefore, for the firm, the quantity of 
land used under livestock-share leases should be extend-
ed. The relatively high marginal return to land is also 
related to the "high" capital/land ratio observed for 
livestock-share renters.33 
The marginal return to capital services is the return 
that could be logically expected. It is not significantly 
above the opportunity cost of capital. The possible rea-
sons for this lower level of return are: ( 1) there is 
little or no incentive present in livestock-share leasing 
through sharing of costs of returns to cause restrictions 
in the amounts of capital services employed; (2) the 
effects of capital rationing are. minimized by the joint 
contribution of landlord and tenant to the total farm 
assets, coupled with the sharing of risks of a larger scale 
of operations; and (3) the presence of the landlord in 
the farm operations dampens the exogenous rationing 
of capital that might operate adversely under the other 
types of leasing. Although nothing has been said spe-
cifically of the marginal return to labor ($54.79 per 
week), it is implied that the rationing of capital affects 
labor productivity indirectly. That is~ as indicated 
earlier, the higher land/labor and capital/labor ratios 
result in higher marginal return to labor, and the cost 
of production per unit of labor is reduced. 
MARGINAL RETURNS UNDER CROP-SHARE-CASH LEASING 
On further inspection of the marginal returns (table 
8), it is apparent that the patterns of resource produc-
tivities under the two lease types are similar but differ 
from the productivities under owner-operatorship. As 
in the case of livestock-share, neither the marginal re-
turn to labor nor that to capital services for crop-share-
cash leases differs significantly from the respective op-
portunity costs assumed. Only the marginal return to 
land is significantly greater.34 
Possibly, the consistently lower marginal returns (to 
all resources) under crop-share-cash versus those under 
livestock-share leasing could be related to (1) superior 
management or (2) different combination of enterprises 
for livestock-share tenants, or both. These inferences are 
based on the larger regression constant observed for 
livestock-share renters despite a smaller sum of the elas-
ticities (table 2). Put in another way, the estimate of a 
marginal return also depends upon the height of a 
marginal productivity curve, which is a function of a 
constant. The regression constant is one of the param-
eters that define the constant associated with the mar-
ginal productivity curve. Differences in the sizes of the 
constants could be due to differences in management or 
enterprise combination. 
""There is no accurate measure of the rental rate on these farms because 
landlord's returns arc not "pure" rent. They include rewards for other 
contributions made by the landlord. But it i. noted, parentbetically, that 
the average landlord's return amounts to 19.3 percent on land invest-
ment, a value that is significantly greater than the marginal return to 
land of 11.6 percent. The difference i. significant at a probability level 
of less than 1 percent, but this assumes no errors in the e.timate of the 
landlord's returns. 
"Similar to livestock-share, the difference is significant at a probability 
level of less than 1 percent. But in contrast, the calculated average land-
lord'. return is only 10.8 percent (lO.S cents per dollar of land) which 
doe. 110t differ significantly from the estimated marginal return of 10.7 
percent. 
The "low" marginal return to capital services of 10.8 
percent under crop-share-cash leases does not coincide 
with what is expected theoretically. The alleged non-
optimum sharing of costs and returns should be reflected 
in a higher marginal return (relative to owner-oper-
ators) for capital services because of restrictions in these 
resource inputs.35 But the marginal return to capital 
is nearer to the "optimum" than that of any other tenure 
group analyzed. The data (table 8) show that the mar-
ginal return to capital is a negligible 1 percent above 
the opportunity cost of capital services. In effect, it 
appears that the "imperfections" under crop-share-cash 
leasing may be negated by such factors as the sharing 
of uncertainties and that capital rationing may be damp-
ened by the joint contributions of landlords and tenants 
to the total assets of the farm. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TENURE CLASSES 
IN MARGINAL RETURNS 
MARGINAL RETURNS USING INDIVIDUAL ESTIMATING 
EQUATIONS 
As suggested previously, differences in marginal re-
turns of similar resources under different tenure classes 
are ordinarily expected using separate (individual) esti-
mating equations. These differences are more important 
from the standpoint of transferring resources from one 
farm firm to the other and less important from the 
standpoint of comparing intrafarm adjustments. That is, 
given different estimating equations ("production func-
tions") the marginal returns will differ at the "optima" 
even under the same set of prices for productive services 
as the choice criterion. 
However, the significant differences occur (1) in the 
marginal returns to land and (2,) in the marginal re-
turns to capital services for owner-operators compared 
with the two lease types (table 9). Other differences 
are not significant at acceptable levels of probability, 
arbitrarily chosen as 10 percent and less. Of particular 
import, the marginal return to owner-operators' labor 
35No data are available on the way costs are shared in relation to returns. 
However, it is likely that the majority of fanns included under crop-share-
cash leasmg do not share costs in the same proportion as the products from 
different enterprises are shared. Inefficiencies of individual farms, however, 
may be counterbal,mced by efficiencies of others. The latter statement ap-
plies to all tenure types and not particularly to crop-share-cash leasing. 
TABLE 9. VALUE OF t FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TENURE 
GROUPS IN MARGINAL RETURNS AT THE GEOMETRIC 
MEANS OF RESOURCE INPUTS. 
Values of t for differences 
Tenure groups compared 
Land Labor 
Capital 
servicl"S 
All owner-operators and lease types 
Owner-operators vs. 
livestock-share renters .................... 2.36· 1.41 e 1.87" 
Owner-operators \log.. 
cro!,-share-cash renters .................... 2.20· 1.24d 2,49-
Livestock-share vs. 
crop-share-cash renters .................... 0.34 O.1S 0.61 
Age groups of owner-operators and lease types 
Owner-operators under age 45 
vs. hvestock-share renters ................ 1.31· 0.66 0.85 
Owner-operators under age 45 
vs. crop-share-cash renters .............. 1.13· 0.49 1.50-
Owner-operators under age 45 
'"S. age over 54 years ........................ 0.80 1.20d 0.20 
-Significant at probability le"e1 of 1 to 5 8ercent. 
·Significant at probability level of 5 to 1 percent. 
<Significant at probability level of 10 to 20 percent. 
dSignificant at rrobability level of 20 to 30 percent. 
Other values 0 t (those not noted) are nonsignificant at probability levels 
of 30 percent and less. 
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of only $17.96 per week differs from the marginal return 
to labor under the two lease types at probability levels 
not usually accepted as significant. -This statement is 
especially relevant with regard to the comparison with 
livestock-share renters who show a marginal return to 
labor of $54.79 per week. 
It is likely that the nonsignificant differences are due 
partly to the large variances of the marginal returns 
and that they would be different if the basic estimating 
equations had indices of correlation (R2_S ) larger than 
they are. But the coefficients of the estimating equations 
may be "biased" in such a way as to show differences in 
marginal returns. Further, the fact that tenants are 
likely to "underestimate" land values (inputs) in. their 
quotations can affect the comparisons. That is, the esti-
mated mean values of land for the two lease types may 
be smaller than they really are in relation to that for 
the owner-operators, hence their (the lease types) mar-
ginal returns to land are "overestimated." Because the 
marginal re!urn to a resource depends also on the levels 
of other resource inputs, it is implied that the estimates 
of marginal returns to capital (for the two lease types) 
are not exactly comparable to those for owner-oper-
ators,3G and when age is taken into account, the sig-
nificance of the differences becomes questionable. The 
most significant differences are reduced from a prob-
ability level of 1 to 5 percent to a level of 10 to 20 per-
cent (table 9) .37 
MARGINAL RETURNS AS AFFECTED BY THE AGE FACTOR 
The seeming coincidence of the relationship between 
age distribution (fig. 1) and the pattern of marginal 
returns to labor (table 10) deserves some comments. 
The age distribution of owner-operators is more neg-
atively skewed (the proportion of older operators is 
greater), with a marginal return to labor of $17.96, 
which is lower than those for the lease types. Conversely, 
with the age distributions of the two lease types more 
positively skewed (greater proportions of young oper-
ators) the marginal returns to labor of $54.79 and 
$48.98 for livestock-share and crop-share-cash renters, 
respectively, are higher than that for owner-operators. 
Although these evidences may not be sufficient, the gen-
eral tendency for low labor returns to follow the neg-
atively skewed age distribution bears out the expected 
relationship between age, quality of labor and labor 
productivity. 
"Owner-operators may tend also to undervalue the land they operate, but 
this tendency is counterbalanced by other owners who may subjectively 
overvalue the land they own. 
aTIn a study in which croJ> functions were used, only the marginal returns 
to land were found to differ significantly be!ween ~he tenure groups ~om· 
)laredo However, the possible effects of age dlfferenhal. were not examIned. 
Cf. Heady, Mal·ginal resource productivity and imputation of shares on a 
sample of rented farms, loco cit., p. 503. 
TABLE 10. MARGINAL RETURNS TO RESOURCES AT THE 
GEOMETRIC MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND RESOURCE 
INPUTS FOR TWO AGE GROUPS OF OWNER-OPERATORS. 
Marginal returns to resources 
Age groups 
Land 
($/$) 
At mean resource inputs of younger owners 
Under 45 years ... _ .. _ .. _ .. ___ ........... 0.059 
Over 54 years ... _ .......... _ .. _ .. _ ........... 0.127 
At mean reSOurCe inputs of older owners 
Under 45 years ......................... _ ....... 0.041 
Over 54 years ... _ ...................... _ ....... 0.092 
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Labor 
($/wk) 
33.50 
2.95 
27.39 
2.54 
Capital 
services 
($/$) 
1.480 
1.242 
1.627 
1.433 
Furthermore, the marginal returns to labor for the 
different age groups of owner-operators (table 10) are 
as expected. For the younger owner-operators, the mar-
ginal return is $33.50 and for the older operators $2.54 
at the geometric means of resources for the respective 
age groups. Nevertheless, the difference between these 
values is significant only at a 20- to 3D-percent prob-
ability level. The findings suggest that in the compar-
isons of the patterns of resource productivities between 
tenure classes, the age factor should be considered fur-
ther. Probably, "management" has dampened the real 
difference stemming from the quality of labor.38 
From previous discussions, it will be recalled that dif-
ferences in intercorrelation, and in resource and enter-
prise combinations can also affect the levels of resource-
productivity estimates. But it is doubtful that (with 
these data) the amounts and combinations of resources 
seriously affect the inferences made with regard to the 
differences that arise from labor quality. First, the aver-
age amount of labor used by the younger age group is 
greater than that used by the older group-91 as com-
pared with 72 weeks (table 6). Thus, a lower marginal 
return for the younger operators should be expected, 
other things being equal. Second, the marginal return 
to labor for the older group is only $2.95-a value not 
significantly different from $2.54-using the younger 
operators' resource inputs in the older operators' estimat-
ing equation. But if the resource inputs of the older 
owners were used instead with the estimating equation 
of the younger owners, the return to labor for the young-
er owners would be $27.39 per week (table 10). 
It is also noticeable that the younger owners' marginal 
return to labor as expected, is more comparable with 
those for the tenant operators, which are composed pre-
dominantly of younger farmers. That is, the differences 
between the marginal returns to labor for owner-oper-
ators, as a group, and the two lease types are greater 
than the corresponding differences in the estimates for 
the younger age group of owners (table 9). The differ-
ences among the other marginal returns to other re-
sources are smaller also. As suggested before, marginal 
returns can be affected indirectly by the age factor be-
cause of the quality of the human agent, capital position 
and work preferences. Therefore, the causes of differ-
ences betwee~ tenure classes need not be entirely tenure 
oriented. 
With respect to the previous analysi~ of marginal re-
turns under owner-operatorship (as a group), it was 
suggested that owing to the significant difference39 be-
tween the marginal return to labor and the opportunity 
cost, labor was in excess. However, the corresponding 
difference is reduced for the younger owners and is not 
significant.4o This reduction in the significance level 
does not substantially alter the inferences drawn pre-
viously on resource malallocations under owner-oper-
atorship; it does reduce the confidence one can place 
in statements made about the excess of labor or ration-
ing of other resources. The readjustments needed in re-
source use for owner-operators under 45 years of age 
'"It i. suggested further that mOre extreme age groups would reveal sharper 
differences than those observed in the present study. 
"0.10>p>0.05 
·100.40>p>0.30 
are in the same direction as those for owner-operators 
as a whole, but they would differ in magnitude as the 
levels of marginal returns are different. 
MARGINAL RETURNS AS AFFECTED BY RESOURCE 
COMBINATIONS 
As stated before, differences in marginal returns re-
sulting from differences in resource combination could 
conceivably be compensated for by differences in pro-
duction elasticities. To test the extent to which this is 
true, estimates on marginal returns that were obtained 
with the common (pooled) set of elasticities for the two 
lease types are shown in table 11. 
Although the absolute differences in the levels of mar-
ginal returns change when simpar (common) elasticities 
are used, there are no changes from the patterns of mar-
ginal returns obtained by using the individual elasticities. 
The returns under livestock-share remain consistently 
above those under crop-share-cash leases. Hence the 
differences in resource combinations (resource ratios) 
are not great enough to cause different patterns of mar-
ginal returns. 
Only a. part of the difference in marginal returns 
can be attributed to differences in resource combinations. 
On the one hand, the higher land/labor ratio of live-
stock-share ($596 per week versus $546 per week) sug-
gests a lower marginal return to land for livestock-share 
renters. On the other hand, the lower land/capital ratio 
for livestock-share ($4.80 per dollar versus $6.40 per 
dollar) suggests a higher land return. Thus, the differ-
ences in these resource combinations exert influences go-
ing in opposite directions. It may be concluded that 
capital restriction on the crop-share-cash farms (lower 
capitalJland ratio) is the more dominant force influenc-
ing the difference in marginal returns to land. That is, 
the greater amount of capital used by livestock-share 
renters accounts for the higher marginal value product 
of land. 
The hypothesis that "imperfections" in crop-share-
cash leasing cause restrictions in the use of capital serv-
ices would be confirmed by the foregoing conclusion. 
But that conclusion is subject to a qualification: Product 
combination and management may also have influenced 
the differences in marginal returns. When the effect of 
the regression constant is removed, the marginal return 
to land for livestock-share leases is decreased to 11.1 
percent as compared with 13.5 percent (table 11). If 
the 11.1 percent is compared with the marginal returns 
of 9.9 percent for crop-share-cash, the difference is not 
highly significant. Further as the differences in marginal 
returns to labor and capital are not significant (either 
with or without the effect of the regression constant re-
moved) it is doubtful that the patterns of marginal re-
turns are affected by the difference in resource combina-
tions under the two lease types. 
. TABLE 11. MARGINAL RETURNS TO RESOURCES USING 
COMMON PRODUCTION ELASTICITIES FOR THE LEASE 
TYPES AT THEIR OWN GEOhlETRIC ~lEANS. 
Lease type 
Land 
. (~$) 
LIvestock-share renters .................... 0.135 
Crop-share-cash renters .................... 0.099 
~larginal rettuns to Tl"SOllTces 
Labor 
($/wk) 
66.42 
44.32 
Capital 
scrvicl"s 
(S/$) 
1.201 
1.165 
TABLE 12. OPTIMUM RESOURCE COMBINATION AND DEVIA-
TIONS OF ACTUAL RESOURCE COMBINATION FROM THE OPTI-
MUM AT THE GEOMETRIC MEAN OF PRODUCTION FOR EACH 
TENURE CLASS. 
Resource Average deviation of 
Item combinations actual from optimum conlbination 
Actual" Optimum Amount" Percent 
Owner-operators under age 45 with production at $17,714 
Land ($) .......................... 27.551 22.518 +5,033 +22.4 
Labor (wk) ....... _............. 91 63 +28 +44.4 
Capital services ($) ........ 8,794 9.825 -·1,031 -10.4 
Total value of 
services ($) ............. 14.087 13.696 391 2.9 
Li\'c<:ock·share renters with production at $22,936 
Land ($) ....................... _ ... 45.884 65.238 
Labor (wk) ................. _... 77 78 
Capital services ($) ........ 9.566 8.181 
To:al value of 
services ($) .......... _ .. .15.399 15.215 
Cro~-"hare-cash renters with production at $15,105 
L3nd ($) ................... _ ..•...• 41.506 59.389 
L,bor (wk) ......... _........... 76 75 
Capital services ($) ........ 6,517 5.274 
Total value of 
,ervices ($)" .............. 12.047 11.837 
aGcomctric mC"an. 
-19.354 
-1 
+1.385 
184 
-17.883 
+1 
+1.243 
210 
-29.7 
-1.3 
+12.0 
1.2 
-30.1 
+l.3 
+23.6 
1.8 
b(+j indicateo an exceSs (or greater than the optimum). and (-) indicates 
a deficit (or less than the optimum). 
eLand services arc valued as 6 percent of the total market value of land 
and labor services at $40 per week. 
INEFFICIENCIES OBSERVED IN TERMS OF 
DEVIATIONS FROM OPTIMUM RESOURCE 
COMBINATIONS 
The preceding analysis was concerned primarily with 
the marginal value products of resources in the different 
tenure classes. In comparing these marginal returns with 
assumed opportunity costs of the resources, inferences 
were drawn as to the direction of changes in resource 
inputs that might be economic with consequent changes 
in output. In the succeeding analysis, production is held 
fixed and resources are reallocated to obtain the mini-
mum-cost combination of resources. That is, the ratios 
of marginal return to the opportunity cost of the respec-
tive resource are made equal. The opportunity costs 
assumed are as beforeY Given· these cost assumptions 
and the basic estimating equations, the calculated re-
source quantities for the optimum combinations repre-
sent the mean resource inputs necessary to achieve the 
minimum cost attainable at the mean values of produc-
tion. 
DEVIATIONS FROM OPTIl\WM RESOURCE COMBINATIONS 
According to the data in table 12, the younger owner-
operators are the least efficient, when compared with the 
tenant-opera tors-the average excess of annual inputs 
above minimum cost being $394, or 2.9 percent. On the 
other extreme, livestock-share renters are the most effi-
cient with an excess of annual inputs' of $184, or only 
1.2 percent. Crop-share-cash renters are more similar 
to livestock-share renters, their average excess being 
$210, or 1.8 percent. It is doubtful, however, that the 
small differences in average deviations (or levels of in-
"T~le.e we~e 6 percent for land. $40 per week for labor and 10 percent lor 
capItal s~rvlccs. Consequen.tly. owner-operators :" a group are dropped from 
tlus sectIon of the analYSIS as the "opportunity cost" for their labor is 
probably lower than $40 per week, if the a .. umption of $40 for tbe other 
tt'nllrc groups has any validity. 
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efficiency) are significant in a probability sense.42 The 
small differences may be partially explained by possible 
errors in measurements. Greater contrasts and variations 
in resource excesses and deficits are observed, however, 
bv examination of the deviations with respect to each 
of the resource categories. 
DEVIATIONS UNDER O'VNER-OPERATORSHIP 
For owner-operators (younger age group) there are 
indications of deficiencies in capital services and ex-
cesses in both land and labor. It is the only group that 
shows an excess ($5,033) in the amount of land needed 
to achieve the optimum combination.43 At the same 
time, the group shows an excess of labor of 28 weeks. 
Thus, to improve resource allocation, capital services to 
the extent of $1,005 should be substituted for land and 
labor. This amount is the only capital deficit found in 
the tenure groups. 
According to economic reasoning, as outlined earlier, 
one can expect owner-operators on the average to be 
limited in land., capital services or both, as compared 
with labor, because of capital rationing. Prior commit-
ments in land purchases may cause a restriction in the 
amount of other capital needed to operate most efficient-
ly with a given quantity of labor. The excess land of 
$5,033 corresponds to approximately 26 acres. There-
fore, the greatest excess of resources under owner-oper-
atorship appears to be in labor inputs.44 
DEVIATIONS UNDER LIVESTOCK-SHARE LEASING 
Livestock-share renters are short on land of $19,354 
(76 acres), or 29.7 percent. In contrast to owner-oper-
ators, livestock-share renters show an excess of capital 
services-12.0 percent of the optimum quantity. Hence, 
the readjustment of resources indicated for livestock-
share leases would involve the substitution of land in 
place of capital services; the labor deficit of 1 week may 
be ignored. In short, these observations indicate that for 
the given level of production under livestock-share leas-
ing, more land and less capital should be used to achieve 
an optimum. This less-than-optimum use of land may 
be associated with possible "undervaluation" as noted 
previously. 
If the malallocations had been in terms of land/labor 
or labor/capital ratios, more phiusible explanations could 
be advanced. For example, if the reorganization needed 
required the substitution of land for labor services, the 
inference could be drawn that landlords are in a better 
bargaining position than tenants. That is, landlords 
would be maximizing the marginal returns to land and 
minimizing the marginal returns to tenants' contribution 
in labor. But, this idea is not relevant in this case. Or, 
if the mal allocations were in terms of excess capital and 
labor deficit, the conclusion could be that a premium 
"Interpreted in a different way: owner-operators under 45 are 97.1 percent 
efficient. Iivestock-sh.are rentel1l 9B.B percent !''1d cr~p-share-cash renters 
98.2 percent. The dillerences he tween these elflclency mdexes are probably 
nonsignificant. 
"It should be noted that this is the market value and not the "annual 
input" of the land. 
"The eXecS. labor for owner-operator. can be identified. perhaps witb the 
general belief that "there is too much labor in agriculture." But it should 
6e noted that. on the average! betw~en 20 and 25 percent ol the total labor 
reported is from the operator s famliy. 
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is placed on minimizing irksome farm operations or lei-
sure time. 
However, there may still be a tendency in this tenure 
class for landlords to "ration" land, choosing instead to 
furnish additional capital that is matched by tenants' 
capital directly. If they provide more land, they may 
also have to provide more capital under the terms of 
the usual livestock-share arrangements. 
DEVIATIONS UNDER CROP-SHARE-CASH LEASING 
The deviations from optimum resource combination 
under crop-share-cash leasing are similar to those under 
livestock-share leasing, with a minor exception: crop-
share-cash renters would require an additional week (1.3 
percent) of labor while livestock-share renters should 
have used a week less. As in the analysis of livestock-
share renters this difference of a week may be ignored. 
Hence the ~eeded reorganization of resources, as in livesto~k-share, is predominately. the substitution of land 
for capital services. The quantIty of land used should 
be $17,883 (79 acres) more-:a devia~ion from optimum 
of -30.1 percent, while capItal serVIces should be de-
creased by $1,243, or 23.6 percent. Of course, land may 
have been "undervalued" as under livestock-share leases. 
Furthermore one might have expected capital serv-
ices to be limit~d in relation to land because of "imper-
fections" in cost sharing and external rationing of capital 
that crop-share-cash renters face. The impr<?vement~ in 
resource use would then be in favor of capItal serVIces 
rather than land. The results do not support these hy-
potheses. It is likely that restrictions in spe.cific kinds. of 
capital items are concealed in the aggregatlOn. ~f capItal 
services. It may also be true that under condItIons of a 
landlord rental market, landlords allocate their land to 
tenants who have the largest amount of capital available. 
Inasmuch as the directions of the resource malalloca-
tions observed do not differ between lease types, the total 
value of productive services required at the optima for 
a similar level of production would vary between them 
(table 13). With the same production of $17,714, t~e 
averaae livestock-share farm would use resources In 
the a~ount of $11,575. This is considerably less than the 
$13853 required by the average crop-share-cash farm. 
The total value of productive services required by the 
crop-share-cash farm would be 19.7 percent greater 
than the amount required by the average livestock-share 
farm. Also, the amount required by the average owner-
operator farm would be higher by 18.3 percent. When 
owner-operator farms are compared with the crop-share-
cash farms, the value of productive services is only 1.2 
TABLE 13. RESOURCE QUANTITIES AND TOTAL VALUE OF 
PRODUCTIVE SERVICES REQUIRED AT THE OPTIMA BY EACH 
TENURE CLASS FOR A SIMILAR PRODUCTION LEVEL. 
Resource requirements Total 
Tenure class Land Labor Capital value or 
services serviccsb 
Production* 
($) ($) (wk) ($) ($) 
Owner .. operators 
22.518 63 9,825 13,696 under age 45 ........•.. .17.714 
Livestock-share 
49.694 59 6.233 11.575 renters ........................ 17.714 
Crop-share-cash 
69.423 BB 6,168 13.853 renters ....................... .17.714 
"This level of production is that for the younger owner-operators. 
"Productive services are valued as before. 
TABLE 14. MARGINAL RATES OF SUBSTITUTION OF RESOURCES 
AT THE GEOMETRIC MEANS BY TENURE CLASSES AND THEIR 
DEVIATIONS }o'ROM THE INVERSES OF THE RESPECTIVE 
. RESOURCE PRICE RATIOS. 
Tenure class 
Marginal rate of substitution of 
Land for Capital for Land for 
labor labor capital 
($/wk) 
Owner-operators under age 45 . ______ .. _ 566 
Livestock.share renters _____ ..... __ . ________ ... 475 
Crop·share-cash renters .......... _______ .... ___ 460 
($/wk) 
23 
43 
44 
AIllebraic deviations of inverse of 
price ratio from marginal rate of sub· 
stitutions 
Owner·operators under age 45 .. ___ ... -100 
LivestocK·share renters .......... _______ ....... -191 
Crop·share·cash renters __ .... ______ ........... -206 
-13 
+7 
-HI 
+7 
-7 
-8 
Value of t for difference between 
marginal rate of substitntion and in· 
verse of price ratio. 
Owner.operators under age 45 ........ _ ... O.lS 
Livestock·share renters ............. ____ .... ___ 0.89 
Crop·share·cash renters _ .... _____ ......... _____ 0.93 
0.81 
0.37 
0.36 
0.39 
3.50" 
2.67· 
aThe inverses of the price ratios of concern here were rounded as follows: 
Labor/land == 666; labor/capital = 36; and capital/land = IS. 
"Significant at a probability level of 0.1 percent. 
"Significant at a probability level of 1.0 percent. 
Other values of t are not significant. 
percent higher than that for the latter tenure class, a 
negligible difference. 
The foregoing differences between the tenure classes 
in the total value of productive services required as well 
as the associated resource inputs are uniquely a function 
of the basic estimating equations representing each 
tenure class. The different estimating equations, in turn, 
cause differences in optimum resource requirements. To 
the extent that these differences are tenure oriented and 
significant, it is presumed that the livestock-share lease 
encourages superior management or selection of enter-
prises. Differences in the estimating equations may stem 
from such causes that are not directly accounted for in 
this analysis. 
SIGNIFICANCE TESTS FOR INEFFICIENCES 
IN RESOURCE COMBINATIONS 
The significance of the deviations of actual resource 
inputs from the optimum inputs were first tested by com-
paring statistically the marginal rates of substitution of 
the resources at the geometric means with the inverses 
of the respective price ratios for the resources. Second, 
the differences between tenure classes in the absolute 
deviations of these substitution rates from the respective 
price ratios were examined. 
The marginal rates at which one resource substitutes 
for another were derived from the basic estimating equa-
tions. Using the basic equation for each tenure class, 
the marginal rate at which the resources substitute at 
the geometric means are as shown in table 14. In the 
case of owner-operators as an example, $566 of land arc 
substituted for 1 week of labor;45 and, ignoring the sign, 
the deviation from the respective inverse of the price 
ratio is $100 of land per week. The other rates are in-
terpreted according to the units indicated by the table. 
"In terms of land services (annual inputs of land) this marginal rate 01 
substitution may be adjusted to $34 ($566 x 0.06) of land services for 1 
week of labor. The same adjustment procedure may b. followed lor the 
other land·labor substitution rates a. well as those for land-capital. 
The objective here is to test for the significance of the 
deviations, 
d j .i = blXdbjXI - PI/Pj 
The well-known condition for the optimum combination 
of resources is that the marginal rate at which one re-
source substitutes for another (biXi/bjXd must be 
equal to the inverse of the ratio of prices (PI/Pd for 
the respective resources. Clearly, if the observed value 
of X j and Xi-the geometric means-are optimum, the 
equality is achieved, and d j • i is zero.46 
From the estimates in table 14, it will be noticed that 
none of the deviations are equal to zero. However, 
most of them are not significant. The most significant 
differences are in the deviations of the land-capital sub-
stitution rates for the two lease types. These are sig-
nificant at probability levels of 1 percent. Although 
resource excesses and deficits (table 12) were observed 
for owner-operators, this test failed to show very sig-
nificant inefficiencies in resource combinations among 
them. The values of t are not significant at probability 
levels of less than 30 percent. This occurrence may be 
related, at least partly, to the relatively larger variances 
of the marginal rates of substitution for owners. 
The fact that there are resource mal allocations in 
terms of the land-capital combinations for the two 
lease types is further revealed by looking at the sig-
nificance of differences between marginal returns esti-
mated at the geometric means of the inputs and those 
estimated at the optimum inputsY The results pre-
sented in table 15 show that only the marginal returns 
to land and capital for the two lease types are signifi-
cant. The more highly significant differences pertain 
to land. Again, no significant differences are revealed 
for owner-operators. 
'''The hypothesis was that the difference, dJ. I, was equal to zerO. The 
statistical test employed was 
bIXi/bIXI - PI/P, 
t == 
.(B,.t) , 
where .(B,.I) is the standard error of tbe marginal rale of 
derh'ed from the variance lormula shown in Appendix C. 
-tiThe statistical tcst used was 
M,.g - Ml.op, 
t ::: , 
substitution 
s(ml.e) 
where M,.g and MI."p, are, respectively, the marginal returns to resource 
X, at its geometric mean and ,t. optimum; and s(m, .• ) is the standard 
error oC M I. g. 
TABLE 15. MARGINAL RETURNS TO RESOURCES AT THE 
OPTIMUM RESOURCE COMBINATIONS AND VALUES OF I FOR 
THE DIFFERENCES WITH MARGINAL RETURNS AT THE 
GEOMETRIC MEANS." 
Land Labor Capital 
services 
Owner'"'operators 
Marginal return at Ihe optimum 
($/$) ($/wk.) ($/$) 
under age 45 .. ________ ........ __ .... __ .... _____ ..... 
Livestock-share renters ........ u __ ••••••• _ ••• 
Crop·share.cash renters . _____ .............. __ .. 
0.072 
O.OSl 
0.075 
4S.22 
54.29 
49.79 
1.325 
1.494-
1.370 
Value 01 t lor difference with the 
marginal return at the geometric means 
Owncr-opl"ratol's 
under age 45 .. __________ ... __ . ____ ........ ____ .. 
Lh·estock·share renters ..... _ ...... _____ .... . 
Crop-sharc-cash renters ..................... . 
0.33 
1.87b 
1.82b 
0.64 
0.02 
0.03 
0.92 
1.2S< 
1.47< 
a1\.largina] returns to resources at the geometric means were presented in 
tables 8 and 10. 
"Significant at a probability le\'el oC 5 to 10 perccnt. 
·Significant at a probability level of 10 to 20 percent. 
Othe,- values of I are not significant at probability level. of 30 percent 
and less. 
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TABLE 16. VALUES OF t FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TENURE 
CLASSES IN THE ABSOLUTE DEVIATIONS OF MARGINAL RATES 
OF SUBSTITUTION FROM THE INVERSES OF THE RESPECTIVE 
PRICE RATIOS." 
Values o( t (or differences in deviations 
Tenure classes compaJ-cd Land-labor Capital-labor Land-capital 
substitution substitution substitution 
Owner-operators under 45 
vs. livestock-share renters ................ 0.69 
Owner-operators under 45 
vs. crop-share-cash renters .................... 0.52 
Livestock .. share renters 
vs. crop-share-cash renters .................... 0.87 
aThe deviations were ,hown in table 14. 
0.32 
0.51 
0.20 
0.00 
0.20 
0.40 
As mentioned before, the significance of the differ-
ences between tenure classes in the deviations of the 
marginal rates of substitution from the respective prices 
were also tested.48 The results in table 16 show that 
for the values of t obtained none of the differences ob-
served are statistically significant at usually accepted 
probability levels. These findings imply that the dif-
ferences between tenure classes in the average devia-
tions of actual total cost of productive services from 
the minimum .costs attainable (table 12) are not sig-
nificant. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
It has been shown that the types of resource adjust-
ments needed to approach optimum production levels 
vary to some extent according to tenure status. But 
it was suggested also that part of the differences ob-
served in marginal returns could arise from the nature 
of the estimating· equations as well as from biases in 
the values on which land inputs were based. Further-
more, when the differentials in age distributions between 
tenure classes are taken into account, the levels of sig-
nificance of the differences observed were reduced con-
siderably. 
The extent of deviations from the optimum resource 
combinations under each tenure class appears to be un-
important because the average reductions in cost, es-
pecially percentagewise, are "small" and do not differ 
significantly between the tenure classes. These observa-
tions then introduce the possibility that either no real 
economic problems exist for the broad tenure classes 
or the methods used are inadequate for detecting the 
inefficiencies present. On the one hand, it could be 
argued that the differences are hidden by the aggrega-
bve nature of the analytical model. On the other, one 
might say that within the broad tenure classes the 
heterogeneity of tenure arrangements40 could have can-
celled the inefficiencies (if any) present. Therefore, 
both facets of the problem require further inquiry. 
'8The statistical test used wa, 
dJ.lt - d,.11 
t == 
S(d,.lk - d,.Il) 
where dj. t denotes the deviation o( marginal rate o( substitution of re-
sources X, (or X I (rom the inverse o( the respective price ratios (table 
14). The subscripts k and I arc the tenure classes compared, and 
S(dl.lk - dj. II) is the standard error of the difference in the deviations. 
The variance (ormula used (or d,.1 is shown in Appendix C. , 
'9Hurlburt, op. cit. 
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The differences in the patterns of deviations (re-
source excesses and deficits) from the optimum resource 
combinations by 'tenure classes, however, suggest that 
each tenure class repres'ents a different "problem situ-
ation" for further study as the causes for deviations 
from the optima conceivably vary according to tenure 
status. Further, for a similar production level, the av-
erage livestock-share farm had the lowest . total re-
source requirement, which presumably is due partly 
to different combinations of enterprises and different 
management. 
SOME LIMITATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS 
As indicated throughout this report, the analytical 
models used have limitations with respect to (1) the 
aggregation of products and factors, (2) the exclusion 
of management as a factor and problems of intercor-
relation and (3) the source of output-input data used. 
No work was done on the problems involved in the 
aggregation of products because the kinds of data 
needed were not available. But if it is true that "im-
perfections" in leasing cause a nonoptimum combina-
tion of enterprises, this question is particularly relevant. 
The value of production from a given stock of re-
sources is reduced accordingly. Therefore, the effects 
of product combination may be reflected in the coef-
ficients of the estimating equations and hence the esti-
mates derived from them. Different functions for crops 
and livestock would reduce the biases that may arise, 
but not completely as the crop combinations and live-
stock combinations may also differ between tenure 
classes. Apart from differentials in price effects, the 
physical response of different products to similar re-
sources are not the same. Therefore, it is riot immediate-
.ly clear that the effects of tenure arrangements on prod-
uct combinations can be treated adequately using the 
Cobb-Douglas type function. 50 A certain level of ag-
gregation of products-crops and livestock products-
is necessary, especially in light of the usual absence 
of information on the division of resources between 
crops and between the kinds of livestock. 51 
The aggregation of productive services into resource 
categories presents a weakness also. The estimate of 
productivity of a resource is expected to change if 
the categories of other resource inputs are altered. That 
is, the difference between tenure classes in the estimates 
for land or labor need not be the same if capital serv-
ices are broken down further. 52 Lumping of capital 
services conceals the way in which more specific capital 
items are used. Productivity comparisons of such items 
as fertilizer and other variable productive services 
would be necessary in a rigorous analysis of tenure and 
resource allocation. 
The exclusion of management as a factor may pose 
""Possibly budgeti,!g of some (orm woulg be mo~e .appropri,ate, ["collnizing 
that a. a model It doc, not usually estImate eXlsUng relahonshlps; ,t is a 
planning device. For the usefulness of linear programming See: W D. 
Toussaint. Two empirical techniques applicable to land tenure rese';Tch: 
linear programming and single equation models. Jour. Farm Econ. 37: 
1354-1363. 1955. . 
"See Christoph Beringer. Estimating enterprise production functions from 
input-output data On multiple enterprise (arms. Jour. Farm Econ 37' 
923-930. 1956. . • 
"0£ course, certain guidelines in the aggrel\ation o( factors arc available 
but these wiJI not solve the problem: they Improve the analysis so (ar ai 
they help to reduce intercorrelation. See Plaxico, op. cit. 
an additional limitation. 58 Unless management is uni-
form between tenure groups, differentials in resource 
productivities will not be explained completely. Further, 
if management happens to be intercorrelated with any 
other resource category for any particular tenure group, 
its effects are likely to cause errors in estimation of 
the productivity of the resource to which it is corre-
lated. This problem, of course, is only a special case 
of the general problem of intercorrelation, which ad-
vers~ly affects regression analysis. 
The question of intercorrelation is also of concern 
with regard to the analysis of labor productivity. With 
relatively small variation in labor inputs in a sample 
of farms, perhaps because of weaknesses in measure-
mepts, estimates on labor may be distorted through 
biases in the regression coefficients.54 
The data on which this analysis is based was not 
obtained through a sample designed for a tenure study 
per se. Hence, the data used do not represent a true 
random sample of farms within the selected tenure 
classes. Also, as the tenure classes usually follow a geo-
graphic pattern, it is possible that such transitory and 
exogenous variables as weather and the extent of con-
servation measures that are likely to interfere with the 
estimates may have distorted the true differences that 
stem from tenure relationships. Consequently, a more 
homogeneous area of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, 
the concern about the valuation of land as an input 
would be avoided as that variable could be measured 
in terms of acres. 
In summary, the estimates made in the study reported 
should be more reliable and useful if the methods are 
refined in line with the foregoing remarks. That is, 
separate functions for crops and kinds of livestock 
should yield more fruitful results. Examination of ad-
ditional categories of capital services would yield more 
information. Labor services should be measured more 
accurately in terms of weeks of man equivalents and 
land measured in terms of acres. 
FURTHER ApPLICATION OF THE METHODS USED 
The crucial observation from this study invites serious 
doubts as to whether the traditional classification of 
tenure groups, by owner-operatorship and the methods 
of rental payment considered, differ in the aggregate 
with respect to the levels of efficiency achieved in 
terms of resource combinations. Even with refinements 
of the model as recommended, it is suspected that 
"For discussions consult Glen Johnson, op. cil.; Zvi GriIiehes. Specification 
bias in estimates of production functions. Jour. Farm Eeon. 39: 8.16. 1957. 
"'For further comments on thc problem of intercorrelation of input cate· 
gories, see Glen L. Johoson. Results from production economic analysis. 
lour. Farm Econ. 37: 211·212. 1955. Sec also, Karl A. Fox and Jam.s F. 
Cooney, Jr. Effect of intercorrelation upon multiple correlation and re· 
gression analysis. U. S. Agricultural Marketing Service, Washington, D. C. 
1954. 
further analysis of these broad classes would not show 
very meaningful differences in this respect. The spe-
cific causes for the differences could not be identified. 
As the small values obtained for the deviations from 
optimum resource combinations suggest that the inef-
ficiencies of individual observations· may be canceled 
by the efficiencies of other observations, it is implied 
that further analytical models should be designed to 
isolate the specific arrangements of tenure that are im-
pediments to production efficiency. 
In the first place, the need for removing the effects 
of factors that are not directly associated with tenure 
per se is indicated by examination of the age factor. 
Theoretically, factors such as labor quality, managerial 
ability, capital position of the firm and work prefer-
ences affect resource use and productivity estimates 
and are important to the extent that they are function-
ally related to the age of farm operators. Adjustments 
for "age effects" apparently become important. Prob-
ably in this connection, a multiple covariance model 
would be appropriate for the analysis. Or an analysis 
of variance model using two criteria of c1assification-
age and tenure-could be explored to detect age and 
tenure effects on the pattern of marginal returns. 
But still, it is not apparent that the effects of spe-
cific tenure characteristics can be isolated through the 
foregoing models, because' within each tenure-age 
group different tenure arrangements may still generate 
forces going in opposite directions. For example, the 
incentives of an encumbered owner-operator need not 
be the same as those of one who is unencumbered. Also 
the effects of nonoptimum cost-sharing arrangements 
may be offset by the sharing of uncertainties under 
share contracts. Thus the results may remain con-
founded. It is then suggested that further analysis 
which attempts to isolate the effects of tenure arrange-
ments should focus attention on the specific tenure ar-
rangements themselves, using the conventional tenure 
classification as an initial device only. If estimating 
equations are used for this purpose, a relatively large 
sample would be needed of each tenure or leas'c type 
that could be broken down into "cells" of adequate 
sizes based on the tenure arrangements to be controlled. 
In making analyses of this kind, attention needs to be 
focused also on the effects of such arrangements on the 
combinations and intensities of resource use and on the 
combination of enterprises. 
In addition to these analytical problems, a question 
to be resolved concerns the identification of the tenure-
oriented part of the deviation from optimum, even un 
der more "well defined" tenure classes. Resource read-
justments are not actually made through continuous 
change, but through lumpy or step-by-step changes. 
Coupled with this question are the aspects of inter-
temporal resource allocation (over two or more produc-
tion intervals) that remain to be investigated further. 
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APPENDIX A 
DATA USED AND THE WEIGHTING OF REGRESSIONS 
KIND AND SOURCE OF DATA 
The data analyzed were obtained from a two-phase, 
stratified random sample of farms. The first phase of 
the sample dealt with obtaining a relatively large num-
ber of farmers of all kinds, and some information was 
obtained from each farmer on the number of livestock 
(cattle and hogs) expected to be sold. Through this 
information, farms were grouped into three classes 
(sizes) according to the "size of . expected sales" in 
terms of animal units. In the second phase, a random-
I ized sample of one-eighth of class 1 farms, one-fourth 
of class 2 farms and all of class 3 farms were selected. 
As a result, the final panel of farmers interviewed for 
details on production activities contained 588 names. 
With eliminations caused by non response, incom-
plete schedules and farms of less than 30 acres, only 
432 schedules were finally selected as usable. The uni-
verse represented by this number of schedules consists 
of farms of 30 acres or more and the tenure classes 
listed in table A-I. 
It is observed (table A-I) that although 20 percent 
of the farms in the universe are under crop-share leases, 
only 27 observations are included in the sample, as 
compared with 29 percent under livestock-share leases 
with 78 observations. This seeming discrepancy is a 
result of the sample that concentrated on the larger 
livestock producers. It must be noted also that with 
such limited data on crop-share and cash leases (15 
and 6 degrees of freedom, respectively), these lease 
types were not analyzed. Similarly, part owners and 
full tenants as tenure classes were not analyzed here 
because these groups are too heterogeneous. 
According to table A-2, the greatest and smallest 
percentages of "small" farms are under owner-operator-
ship and livestock-share lease, respectively. It is also 
noticeable that the steepest gradient (percentagewise) 
TABLE A-I. FARM OPERATORS ANALYZED AND THEIR 
DISTRIBUTION IN PERCENTAGES BETWEEN TENURE AND 
LEASE TYPES. 
Tennre type Number of operators 
Owner-operatorship ................ 158 
Part-ownership .......................... 76 
Full.tenancy .............................. 198 
Total.................................... 432 
Lease type Numher of tenants 
Livestock·share ........................ .. 
Crop.share·cash ...................... .. 
g~~h·s~.~.~~ .. :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Total ..................................... . 
78 
75 
27 
IS 
1!J8 
Percentage of totala 
39 
15 
46 
100 
Percentage of totala 
29 
42 
20 
9 
100 
"These percentages cannot be obtained directly from the numbers of 
operators indicated. The percentages are weighted according to the number 
of observations in each farm class (size) falling within each tenure and 
lease type. 
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Tenure and lease types 
Cia" Farm Owner- Part· Livestock· Cropwsharcw 
offal'm size operators owners share ren ters cash renters 
I "small" 71 57 48 69 
2 "medium" 25 34 41 211 
3 "large" 4 9 II 3 
Total ................... .100 100 100 100 
from small to large farms is under owner-operatorship, 
the lowest gradient under livestock-share lea~e, and 
part-owner and crop-share-cash lease occupy inter-
mediate positions. These distributions reflect what 
would ordinarily be expected: livestock production is 
the criterion of size classification. Thus more livestock-
share renters are included in the sample. Size classifi-
cation is evidently not independent of tenure classifica-
tion in the universe represented by the sample. 
WEIGHTING OF REGRESSIONS 
As the data used are from observations stratified 
by "farm size" (classes 1, 2, 3) with sampling pro-
portions of Va, %, and 1, respectively, applied to each 
class, the corrected sums of squares and cross products 
of the regression variables were weighted. These mo-
ments were calculated separately for the three classes 
of farms around the individual class means and then 
added over classes after applying the appropriate 
weights to each class as follows: Class 1 farms - WI 
= 8/13, class 2 farms - W2 = 4/13, and class 3 
farms -. Wa = 1/13. That is, denoting Wh as the 
weight of the h-th class, the weights are such that 
~Wh = 1. 
To simplify the computations, the plain integers of 
8, 4 and 1 were used as weights to obtain weighting 
desired. Thus, 
(1) the weighted corrected sums of squares 
(2) the weighted corrected sums of cross products 
3 Ph 
= ~Wh ~xixj ; and 
(3) the weighted means of the variables 
APPENDIX B 
SOLUTION USED FOR OPTIMUM RESOURCE COMBINATION 
With the basic estimating equations derived, the op-
timum combination of resources for each tenure class, 
respectively, was found by obtaining the equality, 
/\. /\. /\. 
oy /ax l oy /oX 2 oY /oX 3 
(1) 
where production was held fixed at the geometric mean. 
That is, 
(2) 
the unknowns being the values to be determined for Xi 
that represent the optimum quantities called Xi *. 
It follows from equation (2) that 
XlPlb2/P2bl = X 2 Xl' , and (3a) 
XlPlba/P3bl = Xa - Xl" . (3b) 
. Substituting the left sides of equations (3a) and (3b) 
for X 2 and X 3, respectively, into the basic estimating 
equation, expresses that equation in terms of the variable 
Xl only. That is, 
log Y = log a -I- bl log Xl +b2 log Xl 
ba log Xl" . 
From equation (4), solve for X/ as follows: 
8 
l/l:b l [log Y - log a -
i= 1 
3 
~bJ (log PI/PJ -I- log bJlbl ) ] 
j=2 
+ (4) 
(5) 
The values for X2* and Xa* were obtained by substitut-
ing X/ ior Xl into equations (3a) and (3b), respective-
ly. Thus, 
(6) 
(7) 
At the values for Xi * the marginal rates of substitution 
of the resources are identical to the inverse of the price 
ratios for the resources. It means that 
for each pair of resources. 
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APPENDIX C 
VARIANCE FORMULAE USED 
VARIANCE OF RESOURCE MARGINAL RETURN AT THE 
GEOMETRIC MEANS55 
/\ 
VCmt) 1 ( b'j Y ) l ( Y) 2 A2;- Sy XI - CII Sl" X'
j 
The factor A2 is the adjustment of logarithms taken to 
the base 10; Sy is the standard error of the estimate; b I 
is the regression coefficient for resource, XI; and Cj i 
denotes the related diagonal element of the variance-
covariance matrix. 
VARIANCE OF THE MARGINAL RATE OF SUBSTITUTION OF 
RESOURCES AT THE GEOMETRIC MEANS 
The ratio blXi/bjXi is the marginal rate of substitution 
of resource X j for XI at the geometric means; b l and 
b j are the regression coefficients for the respective re-
sources j Sl and Sj are the standard' errors of the re-
gression coefficients; and rlj is the net correlation co-
efficient between the respective resources. 
The standard error of the difference between tenure 
classes in the deviations (dj.d of the marginal rate of 
substitution from the inverse of the price ratios was 
estimated by 
1/\ /\ 
s(dj.ik-dj.i1) = V V(d j • 1k) + V(dj.\I) . 
The subscripts k and I denote the tenure classes com-
pared; and 
where d i.j = biXj/bjX I - Pt/P j , or bi/b j (Xj/X l -
Xj*/XI*)' The values for Xj* and Xt* are the resource 
inputs at the optimum combination. 
·'Obtained from H. O. Carter and n. O. Hartley. A variance formula for 
marginal pl'OduClivily estimales IIsing the CDbh-Dou~las funclion. (Un-
fI"hli'hod manu,cript). Iowa Siale Collrge, Am •• , Iowa. 1955. 
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